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Summary 
This report describes the significance of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (FM(C)T), its 
most important elements, the major areas of contention and the prospects for progress. 
Its purpose is mainly to serve as a background for negotiators, decision makers and ana-
lysts who are interested in nuclear arms control. 
The FM(C)T is a treaty that does not yet exist but that is as important as the Compre-
hensive Treaty Ban Treaty (CTBT). It shall limit or reduce the quantities of fissile material 
for nuclear weapons. It is called Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), or Fissile Material 
Treaty (FMT), depending on the idea of what its scope should be, whether it should cut off 
only future production or whether it should also include regulations on already existing 
materials. It was expected for years that the Conference of Disarmament (CD) would nego-
tiate this treaty, as it successfully negotiated the CTBT. But since 1996, the CD has been 
deadlocked. Since all its decisions are made by consensus, including its work program, one 
single opponent can not only block all progress but also any work at all. This has happened 
year after year. Not only is there no consensus on the beginning of the negotiations, but also 
concerning almost all aspects of the treaty which have been heavily disputed for years. 
The idea of limiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons traces back 
to the so-called Baruch Plan of 1946. In 1994, many delegations wished to start negotia-
tions in the CD immediately after the end of the CTBT negotiations. It soon became clear 
that there was disagreement concerning the scope of the treaty. Several delegations 
wanted to include provisions on already existing fissile material, but several others cate-
gorically rejected this idea. The so-called Shannon-Mandate lays out a compromise which 
reserves the option of including existing stocks or not. 
Contrary to the expectations, the CD was unable to agree on a work program in the fol-
lowing years. The reason is the abuse of the rules of the CD which makes decisions by con-
sensus, not only on substance but also on procedural questions. Furthermore, every year, all 
procedural decisions are discarded, and the CD must start anew to find a consensus on a 
Work Programme. Over the years, the delegations which have blocked progress varied. 
Currently, the most visible delegation is Pakistan, which insists on including stocks. The 
situation today can be traced back to lessons learned from the CTBT negotiations. 
The FM(C)T will have many benefits, on which different states place different empha-
sis. First of all, it would at least be a theoretical symbol of an end to the arms race and 
would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Secondly, rights and duties would be the 
same for all parties, and thus reduce the discrimination that is inherent in the NP regime. 
Thirdly, it has the potential to draw in the states outside the NPT. Fourthly, international 
duties promote a culture of responsibility and transparency, by which the risk of illegal 
diversion may be reduced. 
In order to negotiate on formulations of the treaty text, especially on its scope and on 
provisions for verification, it is useful to have a common language by using agreed-upon 
definitions. A helpful technical categorization of fissile material is their usefulness for 
nuclear explosives, irrespective of their actual use. The IAEA has provided such defini-
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tions in order to regulate safeguards provisions. Another categorization, according to the 
actual use, is needed to negotiate and regulate the scope. It should distinguish between 
fissile material under safeguards, civilian fissile material and fissile material declared as 
excess to defense needs but not yet under safeguards, fissile material considered excess to 
defence needs but not declared so, naval fuel, and fissile material in use for nuclear explo-
sives. The term “production” can be understood in a narrow or a broad sense, depending 
on whether irradiation in reactors is included or not. 
The scope of an FM(C)T is heavily contested. But between the two extremes – no 
regulations on materials produced prior to entry into force (EIF) or a ban on the posses-
sion of any non-safeguarded materials – there are many variations. Examples are irrever-
sibility of disarmament by a ban on re-designation of fissile material to explosive needs; 
declarations of excess materials produced prior to EIF, or a ban on production of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) for naval use. 
Just as there are many variations of scope, there are also many verification scenarios, 
extending from just a fence around former military reprocessing and enrichment facilities 
to intrusive global concepts. In order to ensure credibility, verification must thus not only 
cover non-production but also non-diversion. This is equal to what is already being veri-
fied in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under full-scope safeguards. The difference is 
the “black box” of non-safeguarded fissile material produced prior to EIF, that the NWS 
will eventually be allowed. The treaty is intended to be non-discriminatory. This means 
that all rights and obligations for verification should apply equally to all member states. It 
is clear that there are still difficulties to be overcome. They should be viewed with both 
patience and eagerness for cooperation towards a common goal. It must be defined which 
levels of assurance of compliance will be considered satisfactory. Such definitions should 
be expressed as probabilities for detecting violations. 
Three examples of verification scenarios with varying intrusiveness and precision are 
discussed: Firstly, the focused approach that verifies only those facilities whose output is 
unirradiated direct-use material, secondly, verification of all facilities whose output is any 
direct-use material, and thirdly comprehensive verification that also includes special fis-
sionable material production 
There are several problems that are specific to the FM(C)T and the existence of non-
safeguarded materials and installations. The first is the need for the detection of clandes-
tine production that is more difficult in the case of facilities to which access is limited. The 
second is the fact that some former production facilities in nuclear weapon states contain 
secrets. Special verification provisions for such facilities which reduce the intrusiveness of 
on-site inspections will be needed. Thirdly, the NWS may possess facilities that are not 
designed for safeguards. If they will be used for future civilian production, installation of 
verification might be more costly. Fourth, another problem could arise if some states want 
to keep the option of producing new HEU for naval fuel. Fifth, special verification need 
would arise if states still possess black boxes of unverified materials. Accountancy would 
be more difficult, as would be verifying non-diversion, and it would be more difficult to 
distinguish between materials produced prior or after EIF. Sixth, it is likely that NWS will 
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continue to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. Verification must ensure that this is not 
confused with plutonium production. 
These problems call for detailed further studies. The studies that are necessary for an 
FM(C)T verification could be started by an independent Group of Scientific Experts, with 
a mandate limited to technical problems. The willing nations should consider negotiating 
the treaty outside the CD. 
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1.  Not much progress in multilateral nuclear arms control 
Several international treaties have beneficial impacts on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, most prominently the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A famous nuclear arms 
control treaty that is not yet in force but nevertheless unfolds effects is the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).1 It is the basis of a strong norm against nuclear testing that 
emerged during the CTBT-negotiations from 1994 to 1996. 
A treaty that does not yet exist but that is as important as the CTBT is a treaty to limit 
or reduce the quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It is called Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), or Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), depending on the idea of what 
its scope should be, whether it should cut off only future production or whether it should 
also include regulations on already existing materials; and it has been pursued at least 
since 1993. The quantities of weapon-grade fissile material amount to more than a thou-
sand tons, sufficient for many tens of thousands of warheads. As suggested by the Inter-
national Panel on Fissile material (IPFM), I choose to use the abbreviation FM(C)T, in 
order to acknowledge both views.2  
While the CTBT can be regarded as a tool to cap the qualitative nuclear arms race, e.g. 
to hinder the future development of qualitatively new nuclear explosives, the FM(C)T can 
be seen as its quantitative counterpart, capping the amount of material available for new 
nuclear weapons. It would be a symbol for the end of the arms race and it would also pro-
vide tools necessary for further nuclear disarmament. 
The proposal of a cutoff was supported by many UN General Assembly resolutions as 
a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament, but it has never become as famous and significant 
as a nuclear disarmament symbol as the CTBT. The reason is not that it is less significant 
for nuclear disarmament than a test ban, rather there are various explanations: Firstly, it is 
more closely affected by civilian commercial interests. Secondly, the interests that differ-
ent nations put into this treaty are widely diverging. Thirdly, the substance of the matter 
is inherently interdisciplinary: Not only deep technical understanding is required, but also 
skills in international law and politics. Finally and simply, fissile material production is not a 
spectacular and unambiguous event that can cause headlines and outrage like a nuclear 
explosion. A treaty on fissile material is therefore less famous and more complicated than a 
test ban, but it is at least as important to nuclear disarmament. 
For years, it was expected that the Conference of Disarmament would negotiate this 
treaty, as it has successfully negotiated the CTBT. But since 1996, the Conference on Dis-
armament (CD) has been deadlocked; the initial optimistic mood soon faded and has 
been replaced by torpidity. Since the CD makes all decisions by consensus, including its 
work program, one single opponent can block not only all progress but also any work at 
all. This has happened year after year since 1996. The most visible actors who blocked 
progress varied over the years, but there has always been at least one. The respective rea-
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sons vary and might be speculated on; they include disagreement with the positions of the 
most powerful participants, or the desire to press for concessions in other areas for which 
the delegation holds the CD hostage. 
But not only expectations concerning a start of the negotiations have been disap-
pointed, also almost all aspects concerning the treaty have been heavily disputed for years: 
The disputes start with the fundamental goals that such a treaty could serve, they continue 
with its scope, and they do not end with its verification. At the time of writing, the negoti-
ations have not yet begun. 
This report describes the significance of an FM(C)T, its most important elements, the 
major areas of contention and the prospects for progress. Its purpose is mainly to serve as 
a background for negotiators, decision makers and analysts who are interested in nuclear 
arms control. It is a snapshot of the situation at the end of 2011, and therefore, only pre-
liminary conclusions can be drawn. Although I do not hide my personal preferences, I try 
to illustrate options in a way that will hopefully also be helpful for readers who disagree 
with certain opinions of mine. 
1.1 History and politics 
1.1.1 Early proposals 
Originally, a cutoff of fissile material for weapons was part of a proposal of the U.S. in 
1946, the so-called Baruch Plan, which aimed at implementing a strong control regime for 
fissile material, but never became reality. It was next proposed by India in 1954, together 
with proposals for world-wide nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban treaty.3 But the 
proposal did not get any reaction; it was rejected by the U.N. General Assembly without 
any further discussion. It was proposed again by Eisenhower in 1956, but refused by Mos-
cow, based on the argument that it was only a tactic to perpetuate an inferior Soviet sta-
tus.4 In 1957, the UN General Assembly, in its Resolution 1148, called for the cessation of 
fissile material production for nuclear weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev made a similar pro-
posal in 1989, but it was rejected by George H.W. Bush. Since 1978, the proposal was sup-
ported by many UN General Assembly resolutions as a prerequisite for nuclear disarma-
ment, but in contrast to the fame of a CTBT, it was treated rather as a wallflower. 
The turning point in the U.S. rejection of an FM(C)T came on September 27, 1993, 
when President Clinton addressed the UN General Assembly proposing a multilateral 
agreement to halt production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated pluto-
nium for nuclear explosives or outside international safeguards.5 This led to a UNGA 
 
 
3 Cortright/Mattoo, Indian Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy, in: Cortright, D./Mattoo, A. 
(Eds.), India and the Bomb, University of Notre Dame Press, 1996. 
4 Fetter/von Hippel 1995. 
5 New York Times, September 28, 1993, p. A16. 
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resolution calling for the start of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universal cu-
toff convention on December 16, 1993.6 
In the early 1990s, other nuclear arms control activities had a much higher priority, 
namely the CTBT and the review and extension conference of the NPT which adopted the 
Principles and Objectives for future reviews.7 They explicitly list a non-discriminatory and 
universally applicable FMCT, together with the CTBT, as nuclear disarmament measure 
that must be successfully pursued. This was the last impetus that irreversibly put the topic 
on the nuclear arms control agenda. Similarly to the CTBT, an FM(C)T has finally also be-
come an explicit symbol for comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and the attention given 
to it is regarded as an indicator of how seriously this ultimate goal is being taken. 
The interests of the official nuclear weapon states in an FMCT seemed to converge. 
Such a treaty would consolidate the status quo which had almost been achieved: the U.S., 
the UK, Russia, and France all announced that they have ceased production of plutonium 
and HEU for weapons purposes. Up to this day, they see advantages in preventing an 
accumulation of fissile material in other countries. China has indicated unofficially that it 
has ended production of fissile material, but has not yet made a formal commitment. 
1.1.2 The Shannon mandate 
In 1994, the CD started to negotiate on a mandate for an Ad-Hoc Committee on a fissile 
material cutoff treaty.8 But from the beginning, it struggled with difficulties. The central 
dispute was whether the mandate should refer to existing unsafeguarded stockpiles of 
fissile material or not. Although the UNGA resolution only refers to banning future pro-
duction of material, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan held out for an explicit reference to 
stockpiles. Also, a group of non-aligned states had jointly and repeatedly called for a fis-
sile material cut-off to include declaration and control of existing stocks, advocated as 
well by several Western and Eastern European states concerned about proliferation and 
nuclear terrorism. Indeed, because of nuclear arms reductions, both the U.S. and Russia 
held excess nuclear material whose disposition was deemed an important task. 
But from the beginning, it struggled with difficulties. The central dispute was whether 
the mandate should refer to existing unsafeguarded stockpiles of fissile material or not. 
Although the UNGA resolution only refers to banning future production of material, 
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan held out for an explicit reference to stockpiles. Also, a 
group of non-aligned states had jointly and repeatedly called for a fissile material cut-off 
to include declaration and control of existing stocks, advocated as well by several Western 
and Eastern European states concerned about proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Indeed, 
because of nuclear arms reductions, both the U.S. and Russia held excess nuclear material 
whose disposition was deemed an important task. 
 
 
6 UN General Assembly, 48th Session, First Committee, Agenda item 71 (c), November 8, 1993. 
7 Fischer/Müller 1995. 
8 The CD adopts its own Rules of Procedure and its own agenda by consensus. An ad-hoc committee is a 
forum within the CD for negotiations with an agreed mandate. 
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But Israel and India, as well as France and the UK, indicated that they would not enter 
into negotiations that would address their existing stocks. The U.S. also rejected the refer-
ence to stockpiles. Its major interest was to draw the states outside the NPT into some 
binding commitments. Pakistan was at the forefront of those insisting to also negotiate on 
stocks, mainly because of India’s larger stocks and its perceived inferiority in this regard. 
Also many other delegations found it important to at least ensure that no civilian material 
could return into the military cycle. However, for the sake of getting started, they would 
have accepted any mandate text, provided that it did not prejudice a treaty scope before-
hand. 
Finally, on 23 March 1995, the Canadian Ambassador Shannon presented a carefully 
crafted text announcing that a consensus had been reached to establish an ad-hoc com-
mittee with a mandate based on the UNGA text, and the CD adapted this mandate. Al-
though this mandate did not refer to stockpiles, the text explicitly states that discussions 
on the appropriate scope of the treaty are not excluded, and it also mentions the questions 
raised by some delegations regarding past production. It explicitly states:9  
“The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multila-
teral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. … It has been agreed by 
delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee does not 
preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad-Hoc Committee any of 
the above noted issues.” 
1.1.3 A series of stalemates 
However, the CD was overburdened by the CTBT work, so the negotiations were delayed.10 
At the end of the year, the mandate had expired, and after the completion of the CTBT ne-
gotiations in 1996, the situation changed and the CD got stuck in its first stalemate. Key to 
this stalemate was India: Most of India's demands during the negotiations had been max-
imalist, namely nothing less than phased elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-
bound framework. It was clear that this went far beyond of what is perceived a CTBT, and – 
not surprisingly – many delegations rejected such demands. India also made some mod-
erate and reasonable proposals, but some diplomats made the mistake of rejecting even 
those, and so none of the Indian proposals had been included in the draft CTBT text. 
India felt snubbed and it refused to re-establish an Ad-Hoc Committee on fissile ma-
terial, unless there would also be talks on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons 
within a time-bound framework. This time, India even seemed unwilling to cooperate on 
the start of any negotiations, in contrast to the start of the CTBT negotiations in 1994. 
 
 
9 Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arran-
gement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other 
Nuclear Explosive Devices, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html (16.12.2011). 
10 The developments in the CD have been described and analysed in many articles by R. Johnson in the 
journal Disarmament Diplomacy. For a detailed overview and analysis of the events until 2006 see 
Rissanen 2006. For recent developments see Paul Meyer 2009. 
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The nuclear weapon states, however, were unwilling to agree to any negotiation forum on 
comprehensive nuclear disarmament. 
The Indian maximalist approach was shared by only a few other delegations, whose 
number crumbled further. In 1998, the situation changed, because India and Pakistan 
conducted nuclear tests for which they were openly criticized. Claiming the status of a 
nuclear weapon state and being pressured by many delegations, India dropped its demand 
for a linkage to nuclear disarmament. So at the end of 1998, an Ad-Hoc Committee was 
set up, but it only worked for a few weeks during the rest of that year's session. 
However, in the following years, the CD was again unable to agree on a work program. 
This time, China, increasingly concerned about U.S. missile defense plans that it viewed as 
potentially jeopardizing its deterrence capabilities, insisted on negotiating not only on an 
FM(C)T but also on establishing another Ad-Hoc Committee on limiting the arms race in 
outer space. This was rejected by the U.S., and a pass the buck game evolved: Each side 
blamed the other of blocking progress. Other delegations tried to suggest compromises such 
as at least discussing or considering issues of outer space in vain for several years. 
In 2003, however, China announced its willingness to compromise. But instead of rapid-
ly engaging in negotiations, the Bush administration first started a review process of its in-
terest in an FM(C)T. In 2004, the U.S. announced that it considered an FM(C)T “not verifi-
able in a meaningful way” and that it no longer adhered to the Shannon mandate which 
includes the term “effectively verifiable”. However, it failed to substantiate this claim. Oral 
briefings remained unsatisfactory, and were never backed in a written form. The arguments 
that the U.S. raised orally in various international fora and consultations are the special 
verification challenges that the FM(C)T poses. They are listed and discussed further below 
in section 5.4. In 2006, the U.S. tabled its own short draft for an FMCT that did not refer to 
verification and certainly not to the inclusion of fissile material produced prior to entry-
into-force (EIF). Some delegations compromised and backed this proposal, but many others 
insisted on the Shannon Mandate, including several Western delegations. Not surprisingly, 
consensus was not achieved and the CD remained blocked. 
Some delegations proposed compromises, among them Germany which suggested a 
“phased approach” towards the goals, by starting with declarations of commitments to-
wards fissile material controls in a first phase, a framework treaty with the general goals in 
a second step, and a detailed protocol in a third step.11 Berlin also endorsed a proposal of a 
Fissile Material Control Initiative (FMCI) “conceived as a voluntary, multilateral ar-
rangement open to any country possessing fissile material”, tabled by a U.S. think tank.12 
The expectations were high when the new U.S. President Obama entered office in 
2009. And indeed, his administration revised the U.S. position towards favoring verifica-
 
 
11 “Creating a new Momentum for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty” Working paper submitted by Germany to 
the  Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Trea-
ty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva,  NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.21, 30 April, 2008. 
12 Robert Einhorn, Fissile Material Control Initiative, A CSIS Proposal, Center for Strategic and Internation-
al Studies (CSIS), December 2007. 
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tion. The CD managed to agree on a Programme of Work, but it did not manage to estab-
lish an Ad-Hoc Committee.13 Objections were made by Pakistan, which stressed that the 
strategic balance in its region had been upset by a new Indian-U.S. nuclear cooperation 
that allowed India to accelerate the production of its fissile material and increase the gap 
between the two countries. The treaty would only manifest the current inequality and put 
a cap on Pakistan. It regards the Shannon Mandate as not sufficiently clear on existing 
materials. Since then, it has not even been possible to repeat the success of 2009 and to 
agree just on a Programme of Work. 
The old conflict on whether existing material should be included had resurfaced. It 
had been lingering over the years and was only covered up by other stalemates. The de-
mand to include existing materials is shared by many, who believe that otherwise the dis-
armament component of the FM(C)T would not be adequately served. A treaty that 
merely bans future production would only serve nonproliferation, by limiting the produc-
tion of newcomers, but it would leave the nuclear weapon states (NWS) with huge quanti-
ties of fissile material that would allow them any rearmament at any time. The NWS, ex-
cept Pakistan, insist that already existing material should not be included. 
In sum, at the time of this writing, the CD was deadlocked again, as usual. There have 
been several reasons for and actors in the various deadlocks during the long time of CD 
inactivity, and most of them existed more or less in parallel throughout the whole period. 
At a given time, usually just one actor was visible, but others were hiding behind his back. 
Conflicts at the outset of a negotiation are in the nature of the matter, but it is absurd 
if, instead of inducing attempts to solve them, they cause the contrary, namely a block of 
any activity. The reason for this paradox lies in the rules of the CD that have evolved his-
torically. According to these rules, the CD takes decisions by consensus, not only on sub-
stance but also on procedural questions. Furthermore, every year, all procedural decisions 
are discarded, and the CD must start anew to find a consensus on a Work Programme. 
Meanwhile, the CD has 65 members, and every single member has a veto, which it can use 
for any reason, be it national interests, a tool to blackmail the international community in 
the hope of being bribed, or revenge for a perceived injustice, for an actually existing in-
equality, or for wounded pride. But rules should facilitate, not impede negotiations. The 
scandalous abuse of the rules has turned the CD from a busy and successful negotiation 
tool into a paralyzed and incapable apparatus. 
The long period of inactivity has caused increasing criticism. Capitals have downsized 
their staff, and impatient delegations are considering taking the FM(C)T negotiations out 
the CD to other fora. This idea is gaining more and more supporters among those who 
perceive an FM(C)T as their genuine security interest. They can imagine starting on an 
FM(C)T with some delegations initially abstaining, like it was with the NPT. Meyer has 
listed several alternatives: Stay the course in the CD, negotiate among NPT members, nego-
tiate under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), let the five 
 
 
13 Meyer 2009; Acheson 2009. 
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NWS negotiate among themselves, and finally create a new working group by the UN.14 
There are pros and cons for all variants. Throughout the years, several governments and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have conducted seminars on the topic in Geneva, 
which were mostly attended by many delegates who took the opportunity for discussion. In 
2011, the CD conducted “experts side-events”, in which the substance is being discussed but 
not “negotiated”. China and Pakistan abstained from these meetings, however. 
1.2 The origin: Negative lessons learned from the CTBT negotiations 
In the mid-nineties, the similarities of the CTBT and the FM(C)T raised the expectation 
that the negotiations of both treaties would follow similar patterns. They can be compared 
in many aspects:15 Both are major nuclear disarmament symbols, qualitative or quantita-
tive, respectively; both are explicit commitments by the NPT members, laid down in the 
Principles and Objectives of NPT Review Conferences; both have a nonproliferation 
component; and both were triggered by new realities after the end of the Cold War, nota-
bly the end of U.S. and Russian testing and the lack of need for new fissile material for 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, many interests and conflicts apply similarly to both. 
But the negotiations on the CTBT took only two years until a draft of a treaty text was 
accomplished, without being interrupted by a stalemate, while the negotiations of the 
FM(C)T have not even begun since 1996. How can this difference be explained? The 
working procedures and the structure of the CD are still the same. The membership has 
grown, but most protagonists of the processes that result in the stalemates were already 
members during the CTBT negotiations. 
The key are some lessons that delegations have learned during the CTBT negotiations. 
The first stalemate arose after the CTBT negotiations, with its EIF clause that attempts to 
draw in states against their will. 
Thus, the major difference between the two treaties is that lessons have been learned 
from the CTBT negotiations that strongly influence diplomatic behaviour concerning the 
FM(C)T negotiations. The CTBT negotiations, in contrast, benefited from a very different 
lesson, namely the successful negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention that the 
CD had accomplished before. The lessons from the CTBT negotiations are different and 
the major reason for the deadlock we face today. They are illustrated in the remainder of 
this section. 
At the start of the CTBT negotiations, an underlying conflict could already be seen, 
but it was not taken very seriously. It can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus 
nuclear nonproliferation, although the majority of the negotiation partners wanted both 
and did not see a contradiction. The NWS were mainly motivated by the prospect of non-
proliferation, e.g. the curbing of any future nuclear weapon developments by the states 
 
 
14 Meyer 2007; Caughley 2011. 
15 Keller 1997; Schaper 1997. 
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outside the NPT, including the development of thermonuclear designs in the cases of 
India, Israel, and Pakistan. At the same time, they were interested in minimizing their 
own restrictions as much as possible.16 
India, a major target of the efforts by the NWS, had the perspective that the NWS de-
manded far more from the threshold states than they were willing to give in return. 
Throughout the negotiations, it stressed the disarmament component, in a manner that 
during the two and a half years became more and more radical. It culminated in the de-
mand for a timetable for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. This goes far beyond any 
traditional perception of what constitutes a test ban, and was unacceptable to the other 
participants, mainly because it was unacceptable for the NWS, and everybody knew that 
insisting would deadlock the negotiations.17 It is conceivable that India was not interested 
in successfully finishing this round of negotiations and tried to put the blame on others. 
Domestically, pressure was exerted to undertake some nuclear tests, thus demonstrating 
that it is a nuclear weapon state.18 A test was indeed conducted a few years later and re-
vealed the demand for comprehensive disarmament as truly hypocritical. 
But the NWS similarly made the mistake of not granting a single concession to India. 
An example is that they arrogantly rejected even a simple and reasonable preamble lan-
guage, suggested by India, which stated that the goal of the treaty is the end of the qualita-
tive arms race.19 Therefore, any face-saving compromise had become virtually impossible 
in view of the strong domestic backing of India's extreme position and India’s final decla-
ration was logical: It stated that it was not in a position to sign or even ratify a treaty 
which had been entirely dictated to it and reflected none of its demands. This mistake is 
all the more difficult to comprehend because a concession would have robbed India of an 
important argument. Its adopted role of disarmer would have appeared less credible, and 
if it would still have resisted to accept compromises, it would have had a hard time to 
justify this position. If one takes the view that concessions would have had no purpose 
because India would not have signed anyway, it is illogical on the other hand to believe 
that India could have been forced to sign by international pressure. 
The FM(C)T is similarly characterized by a conflict labelled nuclear disarmament ver-
sus nuclear nonproliferation, visible since the struggle over the Shannon Mandate. Initial-
ly, in 1996, the most visible protagonist of the first stalemate was India, its exaggerated 
demand, but also the bad way it had been treated. Many delegations learned the lesson 
that on the one hand they might expect tricks that draw them into positions that they 
reject and so they have become more suspicious. On the other hand, they learned the 
 
 
16 It must be emphasized, however, that the scope of the CTBT turned out to be more rigourous than ob-
servers had realisticly expected, caused by events that were triggered by the timely coincidence of negotia-
tions on scope and the international pressure on France because of its resumption of nuclear testing. The 
CTBT in fact is now a good tool for curbing the qualitative arms race. See Schaper 1997. 
17 Bidway/Vanaik 1997. 
18 See for example: Brahmah Chellaney, If pushed over Test Ban Pact, India could really ‘Go Nuclear’, IHT, 
7-8 September 1996. 
19 Johnsohn, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Endgame, Acronym No 9, April 1996. 
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lesson that there is a tool to exert pressure, namely blocking consensus and thus any 
progress in the CD. 
During the CTBT negotiations, the disagreement about what weighs more, nuclear 
disarmament or nonproliferation, popped up only at the end of the negotiations, when 
the CD dealt with the EIF. This time, however, many delegations are already suspicious of 
tricks, and the stalemate has arisen before the negotiations have started. Instead of being 
open to contradicting positions, Pakistan insists on a formulation that reflects the out-
come of the negotiations it desires. 
In sum, the lessons of the CTBT negotiations have caused the current stalemate, they 
have taught delegations to abuse the rules of procedures of the CD. They have also wea-
kened the perception that a treaty might be beneficial for all participants, instead, many 
delegations now believe that there will be winners and losers, and they perceive the two 
components nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation as a contradiction instead of a 
mutual reinforcement. 
2.  Why an FM(C)T is important – four benefits 
The FM(C)T will have many benefits, and many states have a strong interest in it. But the 
emphasis that they place on the different benefits of the treaty varies, and fatally, some 
states regard them as contradictory instead of as reinforcing. As a result, there are differ-
ent positions on scope and verification. Each delegation will try to push its priorities, for 
example in language on the preamble, on scope, on verification, or on EIF, as happened in 
case of the CTBT. If the states do not take care to view the various benefits as mutually 
reinforcing, an FM(C)T is unlikely to ever materialize. In the following, four advantages 
of the treaty will be presented. 
2.1 Irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and implementation of Article VI 
of the NPT 
The uncontested minimum goal of an FM(C)T is a ban on future production of fissile 
material for explosive purposes. This means that the quantities can only be reduced, but 
not increased which is at least a theoretical symbol of an end to the arms race. 
Both, the FM(C)T and the CTBT have been labelled as “nuclear disarmament measures” 
in terms of article VI of the NPT and have been included in the list of Principles and Objec-
tives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament at the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference 1995. Successful FM(C)T negotiations therefore would strengthen the NPT. 
Critics maintain that just a cutoff is not enough, since large quantities of fissile material 
are excess. They are owned by the nuclear-weapon states and exceed the quantities needed 
for a potential rearmament up to numbers of the peak of the Cold War (see appendix I for a 
quantitative overview). Therefore, they claim, it is necessary to reduce the existing quanti-
ties. Only then would a treaty have the effect of nuclear disarmament. This view is rejected 
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by several delegations. The proponents are still the same as during the negotiations of the 
Shannon Mandate, when this conflict also played a central role, as described above. It plays 
a role in the deadlock of the CD, and similarly it will play a central role in the negotiations 
on scope. Pakistan is at the forefront of those who demand an inclusion of previously fabri-
cated fissile material, while the nuclear weapon states are opposed. 
2.2 Reducing the discrimination of the NPT 
The UNGA resolution and the principles and objectives refer to the principle of nondi-
scrimination of an FM(C)T. Unlike the NPT, an FM(C)T would not discriminate between 
nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states. Rights and duties would be the same for all par-
ties. Furthermore, it is unlikely that it will impose any duties for non-nuclear-weapon 
states that go beyond those of the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapon states are already verifiably 
not producing fissile material for explosive purposes. Therefore, an FM(C)T would mean 
additional duties for the nuclear-weapon states but not for the non-nuclear-weapon 
states, thus it would result in a reduction of the discrimination in the non-proliferation 
regime. The nuclear industry in the non-nuclear-weapon states sometimes claims that it 
perceives a disadvantage in comparison to their competitors in the nuclear-weapon states. 
Whether this claim is true or not, an FM(C)T will insert some duties for the nuclear in-
dustry in the nuclear-weapon states and will appease such complaints. 
Nevertheless, discrimination in the nonproliferation regime as a whole will not be to-
tally eliminated, because the FM(C)T will not be a “Global Zero” treaty, e.g. a treaty for a 
world without nuclear weapons. Some disarmament advocates criticize this. They main-
tain that an FM(C)T would serve only as an alibi, because the NWS would still be allowed 
large quantities of fissile material for weapons, while the NNWS would not, at least as 
long as the duties for the NWS would be minor. Indeed, there are constituencies in the 
nuclear-weapon states that have no interest in reducing the discrimination. 
2.3 Drawing in states outside the NPT 
A benefit of a treaty would be its potential to draw in those states outside the NPT – India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. For some states, this is the major motivation, because 
they want to cap the number of warheads in these states. Similarly, drawing them in was 
the motivation of some states during the CTBT negotiations, for some delegations by far 
the most important one, but not so for others. This led to the conflict on EIF of the CTBT. 
A repetition of this conflict must not be allowed this time. This means that a FM(C)T 
must offer enough incentives for states outside the NPT, and all states should accept that 
in an initial phase some delegations might still abstain. Today, it seems that the number of 
states who insist that all NWS, states outside the CD, and all users of nuclear energy must 
be part of it, is shrinking. 
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2.4 Reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and promoting a culture of  
“international responsibility” 
In non-nuclear-weapon states, the nuclear industry has responsibilities to the IAEA. Ma-
terial accountancy is precise so that it can be presented to the IAEA at any time. The 
technical equipment for safeguards and security is installed in all plants, and international 
duties promote a culture of responsibility and transparency. In contrast, in some nuclear-
weapon states and states outside the NPT, the nuclear industry is perceived as a matter of 
purely national concern. Verification of an FM(C)T would introduce standards of ac-
countancy and adequate discipline, and would replace the notion of “national concern” 
with the notion of “international responsibility”. This would change the nuclear culture, 
cause more discipline in accountancy, and in turn could lessen the risks of illegal diver-
sion. Not surprisingly, this argument holds especially in NNWS with nuclear industry, 
but not in NWS. They claim that their security is sufficient and that they do not need the 
international community to improve their own discipline. 
3.  Definitions and categorization of fissile material 
In order to negotiate on formulations of a treaty text, especially on its scope and on provi-
sions for verification, it is useful to have a common language by using agreed definitions. 
Both the terms “fissile material” and “production” have ambiguous meanings because 
they cover a range of different options. Consequently, it is useful to have a range of terms 
to allow for clarity in language on scope and on verification. 
3.1 Technical categorization of fissile material according to IAEA definitions 
Although the term “fissile material” is defined in physics, it is not in arms control.20 In the 
context of an FM(C)T, the term “fissile” is commonly understood as all materials that can 
be used for the fabrication of explosives, namely HEU, U-233, and plutonium, but also 
neptunium and eventually americium and others. Indeed, a helpful categorization of fis-
sile material is their usefulness for nuclear explosives. 
The IAEA has undertaken to give a legal meaning to technical substance and has de-
fined several technical terms for use in legal documents on safeguards regulations. These 
definitions have become standards and eventually can be refined in case of new insights. 
Depending on the technical hurdles on the way to an explosive, these categories are unir-
radiated or irradiated direct use material, indirect use material, special fissionable material, 
simply nuclear material and other material.21 
The definitions have been used by scientists and safeguards practitioners for decades. 
Whether or not FM(C)T verification will be similar to NPT verification, it will at least 
 
 
20  In physics, only those isotopes are called “fissile” that can be fissioned with thermal neutrons. 
21 The text of the definitions is in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001. 
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draw from these experiences. In order to be clear about what is similar and what is differ-
ent, it is highly recommendable to define technical terms in the context of scope and veri-
fication provisions by using this language. Nevertheless, as the IAEA safeguards cover 
only civilian materials, in supplement to this technical categorization, a categorization in 
terms of use of material will also be needed, which is discussed in the next section. 
Appendix II gives an overview on nuclear materials and isotopes, their role in the de-
velopment of an explosive, and their IAEA categorization. 
3.2 Political categorization of fissile material 
While the technical terms are very useful in shaping language on verification, they are not 
sufficient for the formulation of the scope of an FM(C)T. The scope must differentiate 
between various uses of fissile material. Therefore, in this section, I propose another cate-
gorization. Fissile material can be characterized according to their use and status, e.g., 
under international safeguards; for civilian use; declared excess; excess to explosive needs; 
or designated for other military needs such as naval fuel, in the warheads fabrication line, 
or in warheads. 
3.2.1 Fissile material under safeguards 
Materials with nuclear explosive capabilities can principally also be used in the civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle or for military purposes other than explosives, e.g. naval fuel. In non-
nuclear weapons states, under an FM(C)T, and in a future nuclear weapons free world, it 
must be assured that any attempt to use nuclear materials for other than civilian and de-
clared purposes would have a high probability of being detected at an early time. The 
means to this end are international safeguards. Therefore, “disarmament of fissile materi-
al for weapons” is synonymous with “submitting fissile material to appropriate interna-
tional safeguards.”  
A provision that fissile material, once under safeguards, may never again be withdrawn 
creates a political irreversibility of disarmament. An FM(C)T without such provision 
would not be credible. 
Since there is a wide variation of policies concerning civilian nuclear energy in various 
countries, it must be assumed that nuclear disarmament and arms control should be pur-
sued independently from civilian energy policies and that the use of civilian separated 
plutonium and reprocessing will also be possible with an FM(C)T.22 “Disarmament of 
plutonium” therefore does not mean elimination of plutonium, but it means elimination 
of unsafeguarded plutonium. 
Similarly, “disarmament of HEU” should be defined as submitting HEU to interna-
tional safeguards. This action is accomplished much faster than the technical disarma-
 
 
22 There are considerations of new fuel cycles that are more proliferation resistant. As an example, when a 
fuel cycle does not include separated direct use material, it is more proliferation resistant than a fuel cycle 
involving reprocessing.  
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ment measures. Nevertheless, there are several differences between plutonium and HEU: 
Firstly, while the civilian use of plutonium takes place on a large scale, the civilian use of 
HEU does not. The only civilian use for HEU is as fuel for a small number of research 
reactors. Most research reactors are fuelled with LEU, and in recent years, the interna-
tional community is working to convert all research reactors from HEU to LEU. It is al-
ready a policy goal to phase out the use of HEU in research reactors altogether. This is 
likely to happen once any remaining unconverted research reactors reach the end of their 
design life. Another use is in military naval propulsion. Secondly, HEU is the most proli-
feration-prone direct use material, as it is easier to handle than plutonium because of its 
lower radioactivity and fewer technical problems with metal machining. Thirdly, what 
makes things worse, detection methods for smuggled uranium are more difficult. There-
fore, it is also easier to smuggle and hide HEU than plutonium. 
The differences should lead to the – longer term – goal of an elimination of any HEU 
production altogether. Whether this should already be specified in an FM(C)T is a ques-
tion to consider. Some delegations might believe that this is likely to overburden the ne-
gotiations. For the more ambitious and longer term goal of the verification of a nuclear 
weapons free world, it would be easier, if the production and possession of military and 
civilian HEU was completely banned and all HEU would be technically disarmed. Politi-
cally, HEU under safeguards should be regarded as disarmed HEU. 
France and Britain are the only nuclear weapons states whose entire civilian nuclear 
fuel cycles are subject to safeguards by Euratom, though not by the IAEA. Euratom safe-
guards are at least as intrusive and detailed as those of the IAEA. All NWS can submit 
fissile material and facilities to IAEA safeguards, but they are also free to withdraw them 
from such safeguards, according to their Voluntary Offer Agreement with the Agency, in 
contrast to non-nuclear-weapon states whose fissile material are safeguarded without 
exception. To date, IAEA safeguarding in NWS has taken place only to a very limited 
extent. The U.S. and the UK have submitted a few tons of formerly military HEU and 
plutonium to safeguards; the other NWS have submitted nothing (see Appendix I). 
3.2.2 Civilian fissile material and fissile material declared excess to defense needs but not 
yet under safeguards 
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia declared large quantities of plutonium 
and HEU excess to nuclear weapons needs. Most of this material is from dismantled nuc-
lear weapons or from the nuclear weapons fabrication pipelines, and their possessors in-
tend either to use it in the civilian nuclear industry or to dispose of it. However, this ma-
terial has not yet been submitted to international safeguards. Other nuclear weapon states 
have not even any declared excess material.  
For economic and technical reasons, it will take decades until the disposition pro-
grammes will be completed, and the timetable and means are only partly clear. In the 
meantime, the materials must be stored, where they remain at risk for rearmament and 
proliferation. An important disarmament step would be to irreversibly submit this ma-
terial to international safeguards. 
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So far, there has been no visible attempt to place international safeguards on excess 
materials. A variety of informal U.S.-Russian transparency commitments were underta-
ken in the 1990s, but have never been fulfilled.23 On the contrary, in discussions on 
FM(C)T, diplomats of NWS up to now have categorically refused to consider any obliga-
tions whatsoever on existing fissile material. One obstacle which is frequently cited as an 
argument against safeguards and even against some transparency measures must be ex-
amined in detail: The owners claim that their excess fissile material are in physical forms 
that reveal too much sensitive information. This information must first be removed or 
adequately protected before these countries would consider the imposition of any interna-
tional safeguards. This is being done either by technical changes to the material, or by 
special managed access procedures.24 Progress on this problem is the prerequisite for 
progress in promoting universal safeguards.25 
3.2.3 Fissile material considered excess to defence needs but not declared so 
In addition to the materials the nuclear weapon states have declared, they possess even 
more fissile material they probably consider excess but have not declared as such. Consi-
dering the reductions of the nuclear arsenals after the end of the Cold War, hundreds of 
tons of weapons-usable materials seem to have become excess at least to explosive needs, 
sufficient for many thousands of warheads. Some of the HEU is allocated to future use in 
naval fuel, but there are also considerable quantities of plutonium that could be either 
directly disposed of or used in civilian industry.  
Declaration of excess quantities and international transparency of all fissile material 
holdings including military use materials is a prerequisite for safeguards.  
The quantities in the category “excess but not declared so” are larger than the quanti-
ties of declared materials. The U.S. reserves large amounts for future use in naval reactors 
(see Appendix I). They constitute an additional reserve for potential rearmament. It 
would be desirable that owners increase the amount of declared quantities. 
3.2.4 Naval fuel 
Only a few countries use HEU for military naval reactors, namely the U.S. and Britain. Oth-
ers use LEU or HEU that is enriched far below 90%. A lot of progress has been made on the 
development of new fuels that allow the conversion of civilian research reactors using HEU 
to LEU without loss of performance. Similar fuels could also be used in new reactor designs. 
But naval reactors using HEU have been designed decades ago, and no attempt to consider 
the new fuels for a new reactor design has become known up to today. 
There are abundant quantities of HEU from disarmament, namely from the category 
“excess but not declared so”. They are sufficient to fuel the naval reactors for many dec-
ades to come, and any necessity to produce fresh HEU for naval reactors will arise only in 
 
 
23 Bunn, M. 2000: p. 47.  
24 Examples of possible procedures are illustrated in Bukharin 2003. 
25 Schaper 2004. 
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the far future. It may be expected that until then new naval reactors will be designed that 
make use of the new fuels, and that this way they allow the use of LEU instead of HEU. 
Thus, a universal ban on HEU production will become a more realistic prospect. More 
countries might use naval reactors in the future, not only for military but also for civilian 
applications such as icebreakers. This should trigger efforts to develop reactor designs 
that use modern LEU fuels. 
3.2.5 Fissile material in use for nuclear explosives  
As long as there are still nuclear weapons, there is fissile material for explosive use. Such 
material can be in weapons, warhead components, reservoirs, or in production pipelines. 
If there is a commitment to nuclear disarmament, the warheads will be dismantled and 
more of this material will become excess, entering one of the other categories of fissile 
material described above. An FM(C)T must take into account that there are states that 
will further possess fissile material for explosive use. 
The two kinds of categorization presented in this paper – technical categorization in 
terms of IAEA definitions and political categorization in terms of usage – can be used 
jointly in order to define “fissile material” in the treaty and to phrase treaty language on 
scope and verification. 
3.3 What does “production” mean? 
The Shannon mandate contains another term that may be contested during the negotia-
tions and that needs to be discussed, namely the “production” of fissile material. This 
term is simple only at first glance. It can be understood in various ways, and this may 
eventually have implications for the scope of the treaty. 
In a narrow understanding, “production” would mean only enrichment of uranium to 
HEU and the separation of plutonium, namely running facilities in a way that their out-
put is unirradiated direct-use material. In case of uranium, the manufacturing of LEU up 
to 19.9% would not classify as “production”, nor would the irradiation of fuel in reactors 
that yields spent fuel which contains plutonium, which according to the IAEA definition 
is “irradiated direct-use material”. As indeed only direct-use material can be used for nuc-
lear weapons without any further technical processing, this definition may be considered 
sufficient. However, it must be kept in mind that the technical effort to produce HEU 
from 19.9% LEU by further enrichment is rather low for a possessor of enrichment tech-
nology, and the time needed is comparatively short. Similarly, spent fuel contains large 
quantities of plutonium, and its separation, e.g. the production of unirradiated from irra-
diated direct-use material might happen in a fairly short time. 
In a broader understanding, the term “production” could include the irradiation of 
fuel in reactors, e.g. the fabrication of irradiated dual-use material. 
Nevertheless, even if the term would be defined in the narrow sense, and the scope 
would be defined accordingly, this does not automatically preclude a verification that is 
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thorough by including material accountancy of the U-235 inventory in enrichment plants 
and of the plutonium inventory in reactors. 
Key for confidence in treaty compliance is verification. Therefore, it is not necessary to 
define the term “production”. The power that the treaty can develop is independent from 
the existence of a definition of the term “production”, but it depends a lot on the tho-
roughness of verification. 
4.  Variations of scope 
In the preceding section, we have looked at various types of fissile material. But at the 
center of discussions on the scope lies a disagreement – whether a treaty should cover 
only future production or whether it should also include existing materials produced 
prior to EIF. During the negotiations of the Shannon Mandate, several states called for the 
inclusion of materials produced prior to EIF. It was the consensus, however, that produc-
tion for civilian nuclear industry should not be banned. 
Mostly, calls for an inclusion of already existing materials into an FM(C)T are rather va-
gue. There are many variations of possible regulations for material produced prior to EIF 
and the scope of an FM(C)T. In the following, some of these are illustrated. They can be 
allocated to changes of inventories of the above listed political categories of fissile material. 
They are not mutually exclusive and their elements could be subject to the negotiations. 
4.1  No regulations at all on existing materials 
One extreme in the debates is the view that a treaty should deal only with materials pro-
duced after EIF. This is equivalent to the view that, in the future, the nuclear-weapon 
states and the states outside the NPT will deal with their stocks produced prior to EIF at 
their pleasure, for example their civilian, excess and military materials, without need to 
justify their actions to the international community. Theoretically, they could use these 
stocks for future re-armament beyond the maximum of the Cold War. This would be a 
contradiction to the Global Zero vision that U.S. President Barak Obama invoked at his 
famous speech in Prague in 2009, which has been applauded by many states.26 Disap-
pointment and criticism at future NPT Review Conferences would be almost unavoidable. 
NNWS would complain that the treaty would be merely an instrument of nonprolifera-
tion, instead of an advancement of nuclear disarmament. 
The most narrow variant of scope would be simply the “ban of the production of di-
rect-use material after EIF”, “production” defined in the narrow sense explained above 
(section 3.3). But even such an FMCT (“C” not in brackets) would offer some disarma-
ment potential, which must be kept in mind: The mere fact that an international verifica-
 
 
26 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Barack Obama, April 5, 2009, 
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ 
(2.7.2009). 
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tion authority has rights in a NWS is a paradigm shift, namely the deviation from the 
attitude of “exclusively national concern”. The more thorough the verification, the better 
the ground will be prepared for future nuclear disarmament. However, it is unlikely that 
all delegations will accept such a modest scope. 
4.2 Comprehensive disarmament 
The other extreme of scope would be a ban of all fissile material for explosive use includ-
ing that produced in the past. This would be equivalent to a treaty for comprehensive 
disarmament. In this case, a treaty would set a timetable according to which the use of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons would be phased out, and this would be verified. 
Warheads would be dismantled and their fissile material subjected to safeguards. It is 
unlikely that any delegation believes that, for the time being, this scenario would be ac-
ceptable to all delegations in the Conference on Disarmament, as, similarly, many states 
during the CTBT negotiations did not accept India's demand for a time-bound frame-
work for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In terms of the above-illustrated political 
categories for fissile material, this variant of scope would mean moving all fissile material 
into the category of “fissile material under safeguards”. 
4.3 Irreversibility by a ban on re-designation to explosive needs 
Between these two extremes, there are many variants. A minimum demand would be 
irreversibility, a view that is shared by many. This means to create a one-way road for 
disarmament. Firstly, nuclear material that is declared as “excess” or “civilian” must veri-
fiably never be reused for explosive purposes, even if it was produced prior to EIF. Se-
condly, material that has been submitted to safeguards must never be withdrawn. “Once 
civilian, forever civilian; once under safeguards, forever under safeguards.” These are 
demands that are easy to comply with. 
In the past, only few IAEA safeguards have been installed in nuclear-weapon states. As 
mentioned, the United Kingdom and the United States are the only states that have sub-
mitted excess plutonium to IAEA safeguards. The quantities are just a few tons, although 
the quantities of excess material are much higher. These are examples of safeguards that 
must become irreversible. In terms of the above-illustrated political categories for fissile 
material, this variant of scope means that the quantities in the category of “fissile material 
in use for nuclear explosives” can only be reduced, and the quantities in the category of 
“fissile material under safeguards” can only be increased. It is unlikely that any state 
would strongly oppose such provision. In addition, an FM(C)T could contain a commit-
ment to increase the quantities of fissile material under safeguards. This variant also 
seems to be shared by many, however the NWS are unlikely to accept a time table. 
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4.4 Declarations of excess fissile material 
Declarations and transparency of data on fissile material are the first prerequisite of inter-
national safeguards and are a goal of diplomacy anyway. The call for more transparency 
of stocks is not new, and so it is clear that it will play a role during the negotiations. 
A variant of an FM(C)T scope could be some obligations towards more transparency 
on fissile material, more precisely, an obligation to increase the quantities of declared 
excess materials. However, some NWS delegations might claim that they don't have un-
declared excess materials, which might or might not be plausible. Quantities of undec-
lared excess fissile material can be estimated from dismantled nuclear weapons, but the 
quantity inside a warhead is classified. Therefore, estimates by NGOs are imprecise. Some 
NWS might want to retain the option of future rearmament, and although they do not see 
the need for additional production, they want to keep a reserve. The U.S. wants to retain 
some of the HEU from dismantled warheads for fuel in naval reactors. 
Nevertheless, more transparency of fissile material, as well as transparency on warhead 
numbers, is on the nuclear disarmament agenda. It is a prerequisite for various technical 
and political disarmament projects. Whether this should be part of an FM(C)T or of any 
parallel or future endeavours, is another question. However, some qualitative commit-
ments to more transparency of stocks would at least show some general good will. 
Those states that call for the inclusion of previously fabricated material should be 
among the first to provide information on their own stocks. A promising example is the 
publication by the United States of its plutonium production and use from 1944 through 
1994 in February 1996.27 In 2001, the United States also published its HEU production 
and use from 1945 to 1996.28 In 2000, the United Kingdom published information on its 
plutonium production.29  
There are various reasons why many NWS resist greater transparency of their stocks. 
It is recommended that they pursue a detailed analysis of their secrecy regulations and 
decide whether some information that would be useful for transparency and verification 
could be revealed. A prominent example of such an endeavour is the Openness Initiative 
that the United States undertook in the mid-1990s and that led to the efforts to create 
transparency of the plutonium and HEU production.30 
 
 
27 United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Plutonium: The First 50 
Years: United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 through 1994, 1996. 
28 United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Highly Enriched 
Uranium: Striking A Balance. A Historical Report on the United States Highly Enriched Uranium Pro-
duction, Acquisition, and Utilization Activities from 1945 through September 30, 1996, January 2001, 
publicly released 2006. 
29 Ministry of Defence, Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium, A report by the 
Ministry of Defence on the role of historical accounting for Highly Enriched Uranium for the United 
Kingdom’s Defence Nuclear programmes, March 2006. 
30 Draft Public Guidelines to Department of Energy Classification of Information, US Department of Ener-
gy, 27 June 1994, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/pubg.html (13.12.2011). 
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4.5 A ban on production of HEU for submarines and naval vessels 
The United States has reserved more than 100 t of HEU for naval fuel. In discussions 
since 1996, the call had been heard that the FM(C)T should allow the production of HEU 
for this purpose. But this would create a severe loophole: 
The HEU and the submarines are kept extremely secret. Should this secrecy be main-
tained, it would not be possible to verify that the HEU is indeed used as fuel. Even if most 
of the secrecy would be lifted and safeguards be enabled, the question must be asked why 
submarine reactors cannot be converted to less enriched fuel like research reactors, or 
why it is not possible to design new LEU reactors. Until this is accomplished, the huge 
stock of HEU reserved for submarines can be consumed. Any new production would only 
be necessary in the far future. 
Furthermore, banning the production of HEU for naval fuel purposes would open the 
door to banning the production of HEU for any purpose and thereby eliminating HEU 
from the earth on the long term. 
5.  Verification 
Just as there are many variations of scope, there are also many verification scenarios, ex-
tending from just a fence around former military reprocessing and enrichment facilities 
to intrusive global concepts. Even if the scope is defined in the narrowest way, e.g. only a 
ban on future production of direct use material, verification must still ensure that materi-
al produced later is not simply declared as earlier production. Otherwise it would not be 
credible. All material produced after EIF should only enter the one category of safe-
guarded material.. 
5.1 Credibility and non-discrimination 
In order to ensure credibility, verification thus must not only cover non-production but 
also non-diversion. This is the same as what is already being verified in NNWS under full 
scope safeguards. The difference is the “black box” of non-safeguarded fissile material 
produced prior to EIF, that the NWS will eventually be allowed. 
In a working paper of 1994, the IAEA assesses the requirements for a credible verifica-
tion of an FMCT as follows:31 
“From the technical perspective, applying verification arrangements to anything less than a 
State's entire fuel cycle could not give the same level of assurance of non-production of fis-
sile material for nuclear weapons purposes or for use in other nuclear explosive devices as it 
is provided by the IAEA by implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements in 
NNWS.” 
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However, discussions since 1996 reveal that some negotiating partners will not accept 
such a comprehensive system. They are the nuclear weapon states but also some NNWS, 
namely Australia. Although in the long term, the goal should be to establish the same 
safeguards system for the civilian fuel cycles universally, they want to consider whether 
some requirements could be reduced to a certain extent for the FM(C)T. 
Another principle has also been stated in the Shannon mandate: The treaty is intended 
to be non-discriminatory. This means that all rights and obligations regarding verification 
should apply equally to all member states. The measures to verify this ban should therefore 
be the same for everybody. NNWS are already subject to a similar obligation and corres-
ponding verification by the IAEA, defined by INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540. During the 
FM(C)T negotiations, two general questions on verification will arise: Firstly, whether the 
verification obligations of the NNWS are already met by the NPT verification, and secondly, 
how close the two verification systems will come. The verification tasks for both treaties are 
very similar and large differences in the verification systems would be interpreted as dis-
crimination. Differences in the verification systems of both treaties should therefore stem 
only from differences in scope between the NPT and the FM(C)T. 
There are two such differences: The first is the unsafeguarded fissile material produced 
prior to EIF in NWS (being in other material categories than the safeguarded one). It 
might or might not be subject to special regulations. The second is the different histories 
of the nuclear complexes in the NWS and the NNWS. The latter have been subject to 
international safeguards for a long time, and therefore have been adapted to precise ma-
terial accountancy. This is not the case for the nuclear complexes in NWS that therefore 
carry a heritage of imprecision in material accountancy. The continued existence of fissile 
material not under safeguards in NWS and the lacking tradition of international safe-
guards cause special problems for verification that have to be coped with, yet have to be 
accepted for a certain time period. 
In the discussions on the verification of an FM(C)T, however, other arguments have 
been raised: Firstly, it is claimed that the verification would become too expensive if it 
would be as thorough as in NNWS and would cover all civilian nuclear industry. Secondly, 
it is argued, regarding the large number of warheads the NWS possess, one illegal warhead 
more or less does not make much of a difference, in contrast to a NNWS where one or zero 
warheads make a big difference and therefore implies a higher precision of verification. 
The first argument must be taken seriously, even though it lacks substantiation. The 
only basis for cost estimates is the above-quoted IAEA study of 1994.32 According to this 
study, which considers the world's nuclear industry of 1993, the IAEA budget for safe-
guards would have to be roughly tripled in case of universal full scope safeguards. But 
even in case of different verification standards, the budget must also be increased, to a 
somewhat lower percentage, but the cost difference between both scenarios does not seem 
to make a big difference. Judgements on costs are determined by priorities. As an exam-
ple, the U.S. has allocated billions of dollars for the maintenance of the Nevada test site in 
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the context of negotiating and signing the CTBT, which is more than one order of magni-
tude more than the international community would annually spend on universal full 
scope safeguards. Apparently some consider this investment much more important than 
investments in international safeguards. In order to assist future discussions, the IAEA 
should be tasked to conduct an updated costs study. 
The second argument needs some more fundamental considerations. Positions depend 
on the perspective whether an FM(C)T will be a precursor for a world without nuclear 
weapons or not. As long as warhead numbers are large, small deviations do not matter 
much. But when numbers become very small, this will make a huge difference. Only when 
the vision of a nuclear weapon free world is lacking, it may be claimed that there should 
be a differentiation in thoroughness of safeguards between NWS and NNWS. It is a fun-
damental question whether there can be differences in treaty compliance: It is a matter of 
great concern if a NNWS breaches an FM(C)T (or the NPT), but is it less of a concern if a 
NWS does? Does the obligation to comply with a treaty not hold equally for all members? 
Or, in safeguards terminology: Which assurance must be created to have confidence in a 
member state? Can there be different levels of assurance for different members? 
In fact, many decision makers in NWS have not yet accustomed themselves to the 
thought of being subjected to similar verification intrusiveness as NNWS. Pride and sta-
tus still play an important role. The FM(C)T has the potential to change this situation 
with a verification regime for NWS, and this is one of the benefits of the treaty. 
But it is not only pride and status that have a detrimental effect on the motivation of 
the NWS for more international control, they also fear that they might get into trouble 
because of their incomplete material accountancy in the past. This is understandable. It 
must be ensured that there is a solution to this problem that allows the NWS to save face 
and avoids any criticism because of past inaccuracy. Therefore it is highly important that 
all member states understand this problem and develop patience instead of discouraging 
states by overburdening them with unrealizable demands. For example, the U.S. publica-
tion of its plutonium and HEU production must be praised as an important progress. As a 
side effect, the publications reveal that the material unaccounted for, e. g. the difference 
between measured and book numbers, is still rather large. It would be sufficient for sever-
al dozens of warheads, due to the past when bookkeeping was not deemed as important as 
today. But it would be a severe mistake to criticize this fact, as has occasionally happened. 
Instead the U.S. publication should be applauded as an encouragement for others. 
To summarize: The vision should be a universal safeguards system for all civilian fis-
sile material without further discrimination. However, it is clear that there are still diffi-
culties to be overcome. They should be viewed with both patience and eagerness for co-
operation towards a common goal. 
5.2 Applying IAEA safeguards 
As discussed earlier, “production” in the context of an FM(C)T can have different mean-
ings. Similarly, as the IAEA does not use the term “fissile material”, there is no official 
IAEA definition of the term “production”. Instead there is a definition of the term inven-
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tory change which defines the differences between entry and exit quantities of nuclear 
material to and from safeguards. There are several ways by which the inventory of the 
material subject to safeguards can change, including production, but also export and im-
port, loss, or transformation into an unrecoverable state. Since all fissile material pro-
duced after EIF will be subject to FM(C)T verification, the “starting point and termina-
tion of verification measures” must be fixed in the treaty text. 
Also the verification tasks will have to be defined. Under the assumption that the scope 
covers only production after EIF, the verification tasks will be: 
• Provide assurance that shut-down production facilities remain shut-down. 
• Provide assurance that material produced at declared facilities is not diverted to 
purposes unknown. 
• Provide assurance that no undeclared production takes place. 
• Provide assurance that no material is diverted from inventories of material pro-
duced after EIF. 
• Provide assurance that no undeclared production facilities exist. 
Therefore, it must be defined which levels of assurance will be considered satisfactory. Such 
definitions should be expressed as probabilities for detecting violations. The probability 
should be the higher the more sensitive the diversion is, e.g. LEU is less sensitive than HEU. 
For this purpose, the IAEA defines so-called significant quantities and timeliness goals. 
During the negotiations, it must be decided whether similar or other quantities of fissile 
material are considered significant to be detected, and which time interval between produc-
tion and detection should be chosen. In INFCIRC/153 type safeguards, a lot of regular and 
frequent routine inspections take place in order to meet the timeliness goals. It might be 
considered whether alternatively, more random and less routine inspections should be envi-
saged. This would provide the same degree of assurance but would be less costly. 
In case the treaty will envision the reduction of fissile material, methods are the same as 
planned for the application of safeguards to excess fissile material. So far, they are planned 
“as soon as practicable”, but not yet applied, mainly because of secrecy problems.33 
5.3 Three examples for verification scenarios 
5.3.1 First scenario – the focused approach: verification only of facilities whose output is 
unirradiated direct-use material 
As an example of a minimalist scenario, only facilities capable of reprocessing and 
enrichment, e.g. those that produce unirradiated direct-use material, would be subject to 
verification. This approach has become known by the name focused approach and has 
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been promoted by Australia for years.34 It is also favoured by the U.S. and other NWS.35 
Their major arguments are the costs. 
The facilities to be monitored can be former military reprocessing and enrichment 
plants, civilian commercial plants, pilot plants, and research installations such as hot cells. 
The output of HEU enrichment plants would be subject to verification. Verification of 
LEU enrichment plants would be limited to design verification which means creating 
assurance that they are not configured to produce HEU. The separated direct-use mate-
rials produced at these plants must then be followed downstream until the defined termi-
nation of verification measures. As a consequence, all facilities that store, process or use 
them after EIF must be included. Facilities that process HEU, plutonium, or U-233 are 
fuel fabrication and conversion plants, e.g. for MOX or research reactor fuel that contains 
HEU, or plants that are used in case some of this material is disposed of in another form. 
Plants that use the material are mainly nuclear reactors. In a minimum approach, the 
verification would end upon irradiation of the material, in which case it must be deter-
mined at which level of irradiation, e.g. at which burn-up, the verification would cease. A 
disadvantage of such a minimalist approach would be that in such spent fuel there will 
still be large fractions of plutonium or HEU which can be recovered by reprocessing. 
At the center of INFCIRC/153 type safeguards lies a comprehensive material accoun-
tancy. The proponents of the focused approach reject this method, thus the credibility of 
the FM(C)T would be unsatisfactory. 
5.3.2 Second scenario: Verification of all facilities whose output is any direct-use material 
An example of a more thorough verification regime is one that would cover not only re-
processing and HEU enrichment plants but also nuclear reactors, and it would include 
not only separated but also irradiated direct-use material produced after EIF. This way, 
accountancy of the inventory of a plant would be possible, and a detection probability of 
missing isotopes would be established. The verification therefore would be able to detect 
clandestine production of irradiated direct-use material, e.g. spent fuel from reactors. The 
materials must be followed downstream until the termination point of verification.  
In order to enhance the probability that diversion is detected, this termination point 
should be the moment when the material is practically irrecoverable, similarly as in NPT 
full-scope safeguards (INFCIRC/153: § 11), yet, the Agency is still provided with informa-
tion (INFCIRC/540: § 2 (xiii)). As a consequence, not only nuclear reactors but also storage 
sites, fuel conditioning and the input into reprocessing plants must be verified. Spent fuel 
produced after EIF should be included into the material accountancy. Otherwise, an in-
transparent reservoir could be created, and the verification regime would not be credible. 
However, opposition against this proposal has already been voiced and justified by 
overly high costs. Frequent and regular visits of all light water reactors are indeed very 
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costly. On-site inspections are the most expensive part of verification. If all reactors in 
NWS would be inspected with the same frequency as in NNWS, a large part of the budget 
will be consumed by reactor inspections. Therefore, it should be considered whether a 
random inspection regime is feasible. Depending on the sensitivity of a reactor, different 
detection probabilities within a time interval could be assigned, and as consequence, in-
spections would take place with different frequencies. This would save costs and would 
still not change the credibility very much. 
Several categories of nuclear reactors can be distinguished according to their sensitivity: 
1) Reactors that in the past had been dedicated to the production of nuclear wea-
pons and will now be used for civilian purposes, 
2) reactors that had been dedicated to the production of nuclear weapons and that 
are now shut-down, 
3) commercially used reactors that so far had not been submitted to safeguards. For 
them, sub-categories must be determined according to the kind of fuel. As an ex-
ample, research reactors using HEU might need more attention than ordinary 
light water reactors as long as the civilian HEU is not phased out. It must also be 
decided whether there should be a power limit below which reactors are excluded.  
There are only about 7 to 10 reactors in the first category. They would require strong veri-
fication, e.g. an inspection regime on a regular basis. This would not be very expensive 
because of the small number of those reactors. The verification that reactors of category 2 
are indeed shut-down is inexpensive. Reactors of category 3 could be verified with ran-
dom inspections. Material accountancy based on reports of all spent fuel produced after 
EIF should be established by the verification authority and followed downstream until the 
defined termination point of verification. 
5.3.3 Third scenario: Comprehensive verification: including also special fissionable  
material production 
In an even more thorough and credible scenario, verification of LEU production would 
also be included. The major element would be material accountancy of the LEU produced 
after EIF. States would declare all inventories produced after EIF. This means that at LEU 
enrichment facilities, not only design information, but also the complete material balance 
would be verified. An advantage would be the ability to detect diversion at LEU enrich-
ment plants. The verification would follow the produced materials to storage, fuel fabrica-
tion and into reactors. As a consequence, firstly the assurance against undeclared HEU 
production in a declared enrichment facility would be higher than in the other scenarios, 
secondly, the verification of the material balances at reactors can be completed because 
material accountancy will cover not only the output at reactors. Instead, the consistency 
would be higher as the input would be also known. What is still lacking in comparison to 
full scope safeguards is a high assurance against the diversion of source material, e.g. nat-
ural or depleted uranium, or thorium. 
A treaty on fissile material: just cutoff or more? 25 
 
 
5.4 Special problems of verification 
Although a long-term goal of nuclear arms control could be global safeguards with the same 
standards for everybody, there are several problems that are specific to the world of today in 
which some NWS possess unsafeguarded materials and installations. Some of the problems 
are not trivial, and the verification must cope with them, regardless of which verification 
scenario will be chosen. But why should we bother with special problems now, at a time 
when the negotiations have not yet begun? The problems are often cited by sceptics who do 
not believe that verification of an FM(C)T would be feasible. An example is the reasoning of 
the U.S. during the period from 2004 to 2009, when it opposed verification of an FM(C)T. 
At that time, U.S. delegates listed these problems in their justifications. This is a reminder of 
the many years before the CTBT negotiations, when many opponents maintained that a 
CTBT would not be verifiable. But at that time, a group of scientific experts was imple-
mented that investigated the various technical aspects of verification. When the negotia-
tions finally started, a set of potential verification scenarios was rapidly available. 
Similarly, many problems of FM(C)T verification are of a technical nature and could 
be researched while negotiations do not yet take place. The problems are discussed in the 
following: 
5.4.1 Detection of clandestine production 
In any of the above verification approaches, it will be necessary to detect clandestine pro-
duction. The methods for the detection of clandestine production are national technical 
means (NTM), including the use of intelligence information, societal verification, envi-
ronmental sampling, wide area monitoring, and onsite inspections.36 Since all production 
requires feed material, reconstruction of past production and full scope material accoun-
tancy will also contribute. However, the latter is mainly useful in countries whose total 
nuclear inventory is accounted for. As long as there are still large stocks of various fissile 
material unaccounted for, or as long material accountancy in a state is not yet fully estab-
lished, it is not too powerful. For less developed states, another verification method is 
observing international trade, which is also currently being used as a NTM method. Also, 
societal verification plays an important role, even in non-democratic states where leaders 
never can be certain that there would be no defectors. The various methods form a syner-
gy that creates a high confidence that an illegal activity can be detected. The methods are 
also applied and further improved for NPT verification. 
The weakest point is the early detection of clandestine production of HEU. The detec-
tion is easier in cases of states without existing civilian enrichment facilities than in those 
that run them already. In this case, societal verification and intelligence are crucial to es-
tablish initial suspicions of a location where inspections can be conducted. Additionally, a 
method could be the detection of the feed material for centrifuge plants, e.g. uranium 
fluoride (UF6).37 Nevertheless, the clandestine set-up of a parallel plant always runs the 
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risk of being detected by societal verification. As soon as a suspicion arises, on-site-
inspections are an appropriate tool to create clarity. 
Clandestine reprocessing for plutonium production is much easier to detect than 
enrichment. Reprocessing emits characteristic effluents, including noble gases such as 
krypton-85 that can hardly be shielded and that can be detected even in small traces at 
distances of several kilometers. In order to create a risk that clandestine production will 
be detected, FM(C)T verification will make use of the same methods as NPT verification. 
But there is a major difference between NNWS and NWS: The role of inspections in 
the clarification of suspicions in NWS can be limited at some “special locations”. They are 
facilities that contain nuclear weapon-related secrets, namely weapons maintenance, dis-
mantlement, and remanufacturing facilities in which processes will go on even after an 
FM(C)T has entered into force. Access of inspectors to these sites will not be possible. 
Also in NNWS, there are secrets in production plants, however they are commercial and 
special managed access procedures are used to protect them. 
Nevertheless, which kind of production could go on in such facilities? Some of them 
were indeed co-located with fissile material production, namely plutonium reprocessing, 
and would be classified as a shut down former production facility in the FM(C)T context. 
Some NWS rework old warheads in order to extract the accumulated americium from the 
ageing plutonium. But none of these activities release the effluents that are typical for 
reprocessing. Taking environmental probes outside such a location therefore is a method 
that gives credible results. 
5.4.2 Facilities containing secrets 
The problem of “difficult” facilities is frequently raised by delegates from several NWS, 
claiming that there are facilities at which safeguards are not applicable, but they do not 
elaborate much. A distinction must be made between two aspects: Firstly, the facilities 
may contain secrets, as explained above. Secondly, and different to the secrecy problem, 
there might be other technical difficulties for the implementation of safeguards which will 
be discussed in the next section on facilities not designed for safeguards. 
The fact must be taken into account that, because of secrets, access to some facilities 
will be limited. Therefore, the treaty will need a provision for the exemption of such facili-
ties from the general verification procedures and for replacing them by special verification 
provisions which reduce the intrusiveness of on-site inspections and enhances the signi-
ficance of containment and surveillance techniques with additional managed access pro-
visions. Following categories of facilities could be distinguished: 
1. Ordinary facilities included in the normal procedures as defined. 
2. Former military facilities now used for civilian production at which sensitive in-
formation can still be found: On-site inspections at such facilities might take 
place with less intrusiveness and special managed access provisions. As a conse-
quence, material accountancy in the interior might not be possible for a certain 
period. This period, in which the inspected state removes the sensitive informa-
tion, must be limited and declared. But all exiting materials must be accounted 
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for and verified, and, depending on the extent of the verification agreed for other 
facilities, also all ingoing materials. 
3. Former military facilities now closed at which sensitive information can still be 
found: The verification that no nuclear materials are being produced might be 
possible with containment and surveillance and additional observation from the 
outside for a limited period. It must be investigated how much managed access 
could be possible in case of strong suspicions. For this kind of facilities, design in-
formation and knowledge about past production is not necessary as long as the 
verification needs only to assure that no production takes place after EIF. This 
provision might be helpful for those states that do not want to reveal past produc-
tion to accede to the treaty. 
4. Sites that store nuclear weapon materials produced prior to EIF. It is possible to ve-
rify that no production takes place from the outside by environmental monitoring. 
5. Military nuclear weapon facilities not used for the production of nuclear mate-
rials such as refabrication or dismantlement factories: In NNWS, such facilities 
do not exist. Any verification activity inside of nuclear weapon factories will be 
very problematic and probably not possible. However, it is technically possible to 
monitor fences and verify their integrity. Environmental samples in the vicinity 
might help to create some assurance that no production of nuclear materials takes 
place. It is also desirable to implement some verification at the entrance and exit 
in order to ensure that the total amount of fissile material transported, e.g. as 
warheads or warhead components, adds up to zero. Details of such verification 
arrangements, however, probably lie beyond the limits of what is possible within 
the FM(C)T and must be subject to future nuclear arms control and disarmament 
negotiations. 
The Treaty must contain a provision which allows states to declare all problematic facili-
ties according to categories similar to the ones explained above. For each of them, verifi-
cation arrangements and time scales must be negotiated individually, e.g. between the 
state and the verification body. However, some general limits and guidelines can be 
agreed upon beforehand. There should be a provision for regular reviews and improve-
ments of these arrangements. Interesting lessons can be learned from the Trilateral Initia-
tive of the U.S., Russia, and the IAEA that sought to apply IAEA verification measures on 
weapon origin fissile material.38 
5.4.3 Facilities not designed for safeguards 
Today, in NNWSs, implementation of safeguards is already taken into account in the plan-
ning stage of a plant, and design verification takes place during construction. As a conse-
quence, it is much more difficult to pursue unmonitored diversion paths. Plants in NNWS 
are well understood, and all their potential diversion paths are known and monitored.  
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In contrast, facilities in states without full scope safeguards might pose difficulties for 
two reasons: Firstly, they might be constructed in a way that the installation of material 
balance areas and key measurement points will be physically difficult, be it for difficulty of 
physical access at some points, for an unfavourable construction and organisation of ma-
terial flows or for partial contamination. This is especially the case for bulk facilities. Such 
problems, however, seem to be more of a technical nature. Remedies might be costly, but 
not principally impossible. In any case, each such facility that will not be shut down but 
converted for future civilian use will need an individual study and negotiation of how to 
establish some satisfactory verification. Probably, initial safeguards will treat the whole 
plant as a “black box”. 
Furthermore, it will be difficult to measure an initial inventory of a plant that had been 
in operation before being subjected to safeguards. Inside such a plant, there will be vari-
ous material reservoirs in many different pipes and containers, with difficulties measuring 
masses and isotopic compositions. Measurements could be incomplete with high error 
margins. The documentation of past production might be unsatisfactory and contradicto-
ry. Even in NNWS, the IAEA occasionally stated so-called material unaccounted for 
(MUF), which, however, could always be clarified later, thanks to the material accountan-
cy. The MUF is not necessarily diverted, but it is hidden somewhere inside the plant. But 
clarification needs access of the inspectors to the plant. For an initial period, there will be 
a limit of accuracy that must be accepted. It must be ensured that no additional undec-
lared operations take place in operating declared facilities. The error margins are reduced 
when the material going into a plant, e.g. spent fuel, had been accounted for already at the 
plant where it originated, e.g. a nuclear reactor. In the future, when more transparency is 
possible, methods of nuclear archaeology might apply, that analyse technical indicators in 
order to reconstruct the operation history of a plant.39 
It is recommended to engage in cooperative studies that identify such facilities and in-
vestigate specific verification methods. This would include taking inventories, managed 
access procedures, and permanently installed measurements. 
5.4.4 Verifying naval fuel production 
Another problem can arise if some states want to keep the option to produce new HEU for 
naval fuel. Theoretically, non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT would also be allowed 
to withdraw HEU from safeguards for use in military naval vessels: In INFCIRC/153 (§14b), 
it is foreseen that verification of fuel in a “non-proscribed military activity” is renounced as 
long as the nuclear material is used in such an activity. Theoretically, the IAEA and the state 
shall make an arrangement that identifies “to the extent possible, the period or circums-
tances during which safeguards will not be applied”. But so far, this has never happened.40 
So up to today, it is not clearly defined under which conditions safeguards of the fuel would 
be interrupted. There are various possibilities: The interruption could be limited only to fuel 
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in the reactor, or it could also be applied to other facilities. Facilities and locations involved 
in naval fuel production are the enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants, transports, sto-
rage, and the reactors themselves. The fuel elements seem to be a highly classified secret. 
INFCIRC/153 provides that the verification should follow the HEU until the insertion into 
the reactor. At the fuel factories, the fuel storage sites, and during transport, special ma-
naged access provisions should be worked out, e.g. using containers, tags, and seals. In any 
case, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear 
material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. Verification procedures still would 
have to be developed to ensure that it is not diverted for other purposes. This has never 
happened in history, and there is no practical experience on how to provide assurance on 
the one hand, but to maintain the secrecy on the other. 
It is incomprehensible why the owners maintain such extreme secrecy on their naval 
fuel. It is therefore hardly possible to create assurance that HEU, claimed to be used for 
military naval propulsion, is not be used for nuclear explosives instead. It is therefore highly 
recommendable to give up the exaggerated secrecy. This would also enable research and 
development of new fuels for naval reactors. 
In case the option for the production of new HEU naval fuel will be kept open in an 
FM(C)T, starting and termination points of verification should be defined more precisely 
than in INFCIRC/153. Nevertheless, not verifying future naval fuel production would leave 
a loophole. 
5.4.5 Verification problems because of black boxes of unverified materials 
U.S. delegates between 2004 and 2009 claimed several further problems regarding verifi-
cation that all deal with the unverified stocks produced prior to EIF: Firstly, without ac-
countancy of material produced prior to EIF, accountancy of the material produced after 
is more difficult. Secondly, verifying non-diversion would be a problem, since states 
might swap safeguarded and unsafeguarded materials. Thirdly, it would be a problem to 
distinguish between materials produced prior or after EIF. This problem arises in plants 
formerly producing HEU that have been converted to LEU production. There are only 
very few such facilities. 
With regard to the first problem, material accountancy of the total inventory of a state 
is in the center of NPT verification, and any inventory change is clarified. Accounting for 
the total inventory would indeed not be possible for an FM(C)T, as long as there is ex-
empted material not accounted for. Nevertheless, it could be possible to establish an  
accountancy of materials produced after EIF. Verification must then confirm that no such 
material is diverted for undeclared purposes. 
In case a state would swap safeguarded and unsafeguarded materials – the second 
problem cited – this can be detected as long as the isotopic composition of the accounted 
material is known, and as long as there is a difference in isotopic composition of the 
swapped materials. If the isotopic composition would remain exactly the same, one might 
ask whether swapping is a problem at all. Perhaps, swapping also happened in the past 
with British and French civilian and military nuclear materials. Nevertheless, the proba-
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bility that swapping could be detected would be enhanced by monitoring the storage sites 
and transports of direct-use materials produced after EIF. 
The third problem – how to distinguish between materials produced prior or after EIF 
– can be solved by nuclear forensics that determine the ratio between isotopes and their 
decay products. The feasibility has been experimentally demonstrated for both plutonium 
and HEU samples with an accuracy of a few years.41 The lowest detection limits are re-
ported to be in the order of 104 to 105 atoms.42 Inspectors normally use environmental 
sampling techniques in an inspected plant and analyze the isotopic composition. The 
quantities to be analysed therefore are very small, and since the buildup of decay products 
in uranium is slow, the analysis methods for HEU must be very sensitive. The analysis is 
less difficult in the case of plutonium that decays faster. The results of age determination 
experiments are promising, but it would be helpful if samples of previously fabricated 
materials would be available for comparisons. Unfortunately, today the NWS seem un-
likely to offer such transparency. It would also be helpful to permanently install portable 
and continuous enrichment monitors, otherwise a detection within a sufficiently short 
time would not be possible.43 
These problems need more study. It must also be kept in mind that in NWS, the same 
precision as that of safeguards in NNWS will not be possible for quite a while. The nego-
tiators should think of face-saving procedures of how to clarify discrepancies that inevita-
bly will arise. 
5.4.6 Military production of tritium 
All modern nuclear weapons use tritium for boosting. Since tritium decays with a half life 
of 12.3 years, it must be regularly replaced and newly produced. For this reason, the nuc-
lear weapon states reject a ban or a moratorium on tritium production. There are differ-
ent production methods, but for any kind of tritium production, neutrons are needed.44 
Two of the methods are industrially applied; the others would need either rare source 
materials or are ineffective. The most common and effective method for military produc-
tion is breeding tritium from lithium-6 by inserting it into a reactor core or blanket: 
 n  +  6Li  →  3T  +  4He 
The other method makes use of the capture of a neutron by deuterium, as takes place in 
heavy water reactors like CANDUs that are moderated by heavy water: 
 n  +  2D  →  3T 
Tritium removal from the heavy water is necessary for decontamination reasons. Fur-
thermore, there are civilian uses of tritium such as fusion research. For example, Canada 
 
 
41 For plutonium: Wallenius/Mayer 2000; Chen et al. 2009, for HEU: Glaser/Bürger 2009; LaMont/Hall 
2003; Hall 2005. 
42 Glaser/Bürger 2009. 
43 Glaser/Bürger 2009. 
44 Described in detail by Kalinowski 2004. 
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is an exporter of tritium, claiming that this is only for peaceful uses.45 Although the cross-
section for this reaction is smaller than that for the irradiation of Li-6, the mere quantity 
of the heavy water needed in CANDUs yields large amounts of tritium. 
While it is highly unlikely that a ban of tritium production for nuclear weapons will be 
part of an FM(C)T scope, it may nevertheless pose problems for verification, because of 
the neutrons that are needed for its production. Any neutron source, reactor or accelera-
tor, can be used for both, either plutonium or tritium production. Thus, any strong neu-
tron source will need to be verified for the non-production of plutonium for weapons. 
And indeed, NWS used their military production reactors for both. For a while, dis-
mantlement of nuclear weapons provides enough tritium, so for some NWS new produc-
tion was not necessary for a while. But plans for a resumption of the production are al-
ready underway.46 Current U.S. plans involve the irradiation of control rods containing 
Li-6 in commercial light water reactors. Russia produces tritium by irradiating Li-6 tar-
gets in a LWR and an HWR at Chelyabinsk-65. This way, the tritium demands will be met 
in the foreseeable future. Dismantlement of warheads yields additional tritium for many 
years.47 China used the same reactor for plutonium and tritium production. Britain used 
four military production reactors at Chapelcross. It also purchased tritium from the U.S. 
at certain times.48 France also used plutonium-producing reactors for its tritium, located 
at Marcoule, Valduc et Bruyères-le-Châtel.49 India's is extracting tritium from the deute-
rium coolant of its CANDU reactors, at its Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.50 Pakistan 
operates an unsafeguarded reactor at Kushab which can produce both plutonium and 
tritium.51 Israel fabricates tritium by irradiating Li-6 in its HWR at Dimona.52 
Verification must ensure that no plutonium is produced for undeclared purposes, but 
it is not necessary that it accounts for the quantities of tritium that may be produced in a 
reactor. However, the fact that tritium is being produced in a reactor cannot be hidden, 
because Li-6 target rods within the reactor core would be revealed. But they would not be 
included into the material accountancy which would account only for rods with fissile 
 
 
45 This claim is contested within Canada. Domestic critics maintain that there is still too much transfer of 
tritium into the U.S. and other's nuclear weapon complexes. 
46 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder: Tritium Production, June 2005. 
47 Bukharin 2001. 
48 Carey Sublette, British Nuclear Facilities, in: The Nuclear Weapon Archive, http://nuclearweaponarchive. 
org/Uk/UKFacility.html (16.12.2011). 
49 Marc Philippe, François Besnus, Sources de production et gestion du tritium produit par les installations 
nucléaires, Rapport DSU n. 217, from: Autorite de Surete Nucléaire, Livre Blanc du Tritium, http://livre-
blanc-tritium.asn.fr/etat-des-connaissances/ch1-1-source-de-production-et-gestion-du-tritium.html 
(16.12.2011). 
50 Perkovich 1999, p. 427. 
51 Carey Sublette Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program, Present Capabilities, http://nuclearweaponarchive. 
org/Pakistan/PakArsenal.html, Last changed 6 August 2001.  
52 Marvin Miller, Appendix:Israel,Tritium,and Disarmament, in: IPFM 2010, pp. 44-45. 
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and fertile isotopes. Without precise accountancy of the Li-6 targets, no quantitative se-
crets would be revealed. 
6.  How to move forward? – Positive lessons from  
the CTBT-negotiations 
For years, the international community expected progress in the Conference of Disarma-
ment, but for years, it was disappointed again and again. Originally, the CD was deemed 
the most appropriate forum for the negotiations, because of its successful work in the 
early nineties when it negotiated the CTBT and the CWC. Negotiations were controver-
sial, often, consensuses were blocked, but no one ever tried to block work as such. The 
precedent was the very end of the CTBT negotiations in 1996, after which the CD never 
again accomplished anything. Delegations had learned how to abuse the rules of the CD, 
and those who don't want an FM(C)T have an easy tool to prevent it. 
The question must be asked whether the CD it is still the appropriate forum for the 
negotiations, or whether willing states should go outside and engage in work for the 
FMCT in a new forum. They must be willing to take the risk that other delegations whom 
they would like to see as party to the treaty will initially abstain. Similar risks were taken 
when other arms control treaties were negotiated. But history has shown that states some-
times decided later to join a treaty. The most prominent example is the NPT. The most 
visible cause of the current stalemate is Pakistan, but it is possible, that some others are 
happy about this situation without being too visible. They would not be interested moving 
the negotiations elsewhere, and the willing delegations should first start without them. 
In spring 2011, several countries considered to move out of the CD and to start nego-
tiations independently. Among them were a group of ten states that published a joint 
declaration (Berlin declaration) on April 30, 2011,53 and the U.S., the UK and France.54 
The Berlin declaration states in the context of the begin of FM(C)T negotiations: “ we 
underline that there is no reason and no excuse for further delay”. It also mentions to ask 
the UN General Assembly to “address the issue and consider ways to proceed with the 
aim of beginning negotiations”. Furthermore, it refers to a joint paper that “lists questions 
to be addressed by scientific experts” and favours the establishment of a group of scientif-
ic experts. The joint paper has not yet been published at the time of writing this report. 
The idea of moving out of the CD was also consequently addressed during the session of 
the First Committee of the UNGA in 2011.55 But it was decided the CD be given another 
 
 
53 Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Berlin 30 April 
2011. The ten nations are Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. 
54 Nations Weigh Taking Fissile Material Talks Outside Disarmament Forum, Global Security Newswire, 
NTI, May 17, 2001. 
55 UNGA, Sixty-sixth session, First Committee, Canada: revised draft resolution Treaty banning the produc-
tion of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, A /C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1. 
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year to start negotiations, however, “should the Conference on Disarmament fail to agree 
on and implement a comprehensive programme of work by the end of its 2012 session”, 
“other options should be considered”. Furthermore, the Committee encourages meetings 
“involving scientific experts on various technical aspects of the treaty”, however, it still 
refrained from the establishment an official Group of Scientific Experts. 
The problems described in section 5.4 call for detailed further studies. The discussions 
presented here show that there are approaches how to cope with the problems, but some 
of the suggested solutions still seem only superficially explored. 
Verification of the CTBT had been studied for years before the start of the negotia-
tions, by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). Their sessions took place during many 
years without CTBT negotiations. When the negotiations finally started, GSE was able to 
present solutions to various technical questions. Furthermore, it was possible to assemble 
several verification scenarios among which the delegations could chose. The experts pre-
sented the options in a way that the essential points were understandable for the diplo-
mats. These fast results would not have been possible without the preceding work of 
many years and many experts on various fields from many countries. 
Similarly, the studies that are necessary for an FM(C)T verification could be started by 
an independent Group of Scientific Experts, possibly with subgroups because the specific 
topics vary. The results would strengthen the confidence in the feasibility of verification, 
as they did for the CTBT. Critics of this idea fear that the experts’ discussions could pre-
empt negotiations. The GSE experts were nominated by their governments, and several 
were instructed to adhere to certain positions. Nevertheless, technical and physical aspects 
are facts whose negotiability is limited. Even if instructed, technical experts could create 
more clarity. Despite some restraints, the GSE experts were able to discuss verification in 
a scientific manner, as is confirmed by their results. The mandate of an FM(C)T group of 
scientific experts therefore should be limited to technical problems and should avoid dis-
cussing politics as far as possible. The members should be selected according to their pro-
fessional expertise. If at all, their nationality should play only a limited role. An advantage 
of GSE was its continuity: The GSE mandate did not have to be renewed every year, the 
role of the chair was permanent and not subject to diplomacy such as rotation. Regarding 
the deadlock in the CD, a similar structure for an FM(C)T GSE would have a substantial 
impact on progress. 
It remains to be seen whether a Group of Scientific Experts will be implemented that 
had been called for during the First Committee, and which role it will play in 2012. I rec-
ommend to let them work on specific aspects, such as those problems listed in section 5.4, 
and to task them with writing reports, but not to pre-negotiate the substance of the treaty. 
Instead, the experts should list the various options in a way that different potential posi-
tions are considered and point out specific problems that need further research. The in-
ternational community should not wait any longer to let them start their work. 
Furthermore, the willing nations should decide to start negotiations without the 
blockers outside the CD. This would probably leave a few delegations outside, but it 
would result in a process and finally in a treaty text. They also should refrain from a simi-
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lar EIF clause as in the CTBT which is the reason that it is not in force today. Abstaining 
nations could join the process, or later, they could join the treaty. There are precedents in 
history, where states first abstained from a treaty but later adhered to it. 
Otherwise, it is likely that the CD would be given yet another year of patience and after 
that again and again for years. I started to become interested in the topic in 1995 because 
of the exciting work on the CTBT that took place in the CD at that time, and I hoped that 
a similar experience would soon be repeated. Now I fear I might come back long after I 
have been retired and lecture on the same subjects as in this report, and still no more 
progress than in 1995 will have been achieved. 
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Appendix I: Figures of existing weapon usable materials 
Table 1: HEU quantities world-wide, figures in tons 
Possessor For explosive 
use 
Naval fuel Declared 
excess 
Technically 
disposed of 
(a) 
HEU under 
IAEA safe-
guards 
In civilian 
use 
Total 
USA (b) 260 130 104 (c) 131 (c) 10 (d) 20 514 
Russia (± 20  %) (b) 616  30 (e) 104 413 0 20 770 
UK (b, f) 21.64 (g) 4.72 (g)  0 1.404 (h) 27.76 
France (± 20%) (b, f ) 26 1 (i) 0 0 0 4.9 (j) 25 
China (± 20  %) (k) 16 ?? 0 0 0 1 16 
India (b, l)  1.3 ± 0.5 0 0 0  1.3 
Pakistan (b) 2.6 ± 1  0 0 0  2.6 
Israel ??  0 0 0   
Non-nuclear weapon 
states (b) 
0 0  0 7 7 
Sources and remarks: (a) The HEU has been blended down to LEU by mixing it with depleted uranium. 
(b) IPFM 2010, figures are as of mid-2010. 
(c) Only parts of the excess HEU is enriched over 90 %, much is enriched to less between 20-90  % (Maerli 2002) 
(d) McGoldrick 1995. 
(e) Composed of 20 t fresh and 10 t spent naval fuel. 
(f) All civilian nuclear material of the UK and France is under Euratom safeguards. 
(g) Ministry of Defence, Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium, March 2006. The UK report 
does not give figures of the HEU enrichment. The UK does not specify the average enrichment of its HEU, it neither 
specifies how much HEU is devoted to naval fuel (IPFM 2010). 
(h) INFCIRC/549/Add.8/13, 16 August 2010. 
(i) Number from ISIS-Online: “The bulk of France’s nuclear powered vessels used LEU fuel. However, one or two of its 
strategic submarines used HEU fuel”, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/military_excess_heu.pdf, 
updated 2005. 
(j) Composed of 3.3 t fresh and 1.6 t spent fuel. 
(k) Hui Zhang 2011. 
(l) Enriched to about 30 %. 
Table 2: Plutonium quantities world-wide, figures in tons 
Possessor For explo-
sive use 
Declared 
excess 
Technically 
disposed of 
Pu under IAEA 
safeguards 
In civilian 
use 
Total 
USA 38 34 0 0  72 
Russia (a) 88  53.9 0 0 47.7 189.6 
UK 3.2 4.4 0 0 85.3 (b) 92.9 
France 6 0 0 0 55.9 61.9 
China (c) 1.8 0 0 0 0 1.8 
India 0.24 0 0 0 3.5 3.74 
Pakistan 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1 
Israel 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 
Non-nuclear 
weapon states 
0  0 0 45.6 45.6 
Source: IPFM 2010, figures are as of mid-2010, in tons. 
Remarks:  
(a) Russia possesses additional 6 tons of excess but undeclared plutonium. 
All civilian nuclear material of the UK and France is under Euratom safeguards. 
Uncertainties of the military stockpiles for China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia are on the order of 10 – 
30%. 
(b) INFCIRC/549/Add.8/13, 16 August 2010. 
(c) For details see also Hui Zhang 2011. 
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Appendix II: Fissile material, their IAEA categories, and their role for nuclear explosives 
Material Origin IAEA Categories Role for nuclear explosives Remarks 
“Weapon grade Pu”: 
high content of 
isotope Pu-239 
Short time irradi-
ation of uranium 
in reactors, fast 
breeder blankets Unirradiated 
direct-use ma-
terial 
explosive can be made from 
it  
No legal distinc-
tion "Reactor grade Pu": 
Pu-239 + substantial 
fractions of other 
isotopes (Pu-240, 
Pu-241 ...) 
Long time irradi-
ation in LWRs 
explosive can be made from 
it, but with some technical 
disadvantages 
Pu-238 mixtures  
(> 80%) 
Generated artifi-
cially by irradiation 
of Np-237 
none none 
Use as heat genera-
tor 
“Weapon grade” 
HEU: content of U-
235 very high  
(> 90 %) 
Enrichment 
Unirradiated di-
rect-use material 
explosive can be made from 
it 
No legal distinc-
tion 
lower grades of HEU 
explosive can be made from 
it, but its size increases with 
lower enrichment 
LEU: U-235 enriched 
to < 20% 
Special fissionable 
material 
enrichment necessary to 
make HEU, or neutron 
irradiation for transmutation 
into Pu 
 
natural U: U-238 
with U-235 content 
= 0.7 % 
Mining, refine-
ment 
Source material 
depleted U: U-235 
content < 0.7 % 
Tails from 
enrichment 
U-233 
Irradiation of 
thorium in reac-
tors 
Unirradiated di-
rect-use material 
explosive can be made from it 
Arise in thorium 
fuel cycles. Tho-
rium resources are 
abundant 
mixtures containing 
U-233 
first separation from other 
mixture components to get 
U-233 
Thorium (Th-232) 
Mining, refine-
ment 
Source material 
Neutron irradiation to pro-
duce U-233 
Neptunium  
(Np-237) 
Contained in spent 
fuel in substantial 
quantities; ob-
tained by modern 
reprocessing 
Flow sheet moni-
toring under vo-
luntary IAEA 
arrangements 
explosive can be made from 
it 
Some countries 
plan to separate it  
Americium  
(Am-241) 
Contained in spent 
fuel in substantial 
quantities; separa-
tion difficult 
Voluntary report-
ing of holdings and 
exports 
explosive can be made from 
it, but only with extreme 
technical sophistication 
Separation in large 
quantities not 
expected in the 
near future 
MOX: mixture of U 
and Pu 
Fuel fabrication for 
nuclear reactors 
Unirradiated di-
rect-use material 
Pu must first be chemically 
separated 
No legal distinc-
tion to other Pu 
Fresh spent fuel: U-238 
+ U235 + Pu + highly 
radioactive isotopes.... 
Output of nuclear 
reactors 
Irradiated direct-
use material 
Reprocessing in order to 
gain Pu 
No legal distinc-
tion 
Older spent fuel (> 
10-20 years): U-238 + 
U235 + Pu + less 
radioactive isotopes.... 
Output of nuclear 
reactors after 
storage 
Reprocessing, handling, and 
diversion is easier 
ore, ore residue (e.g. 
yellow cake) 
Mining, refine-
ment 
none 
natural U is made from it, 
IAEA: “other material” 
Found all over the 
world  
Tritium 
Neutrons are 
needed for its 
production 
none 
for fusion processes during a 
nuclear explosion 
Not “fissile” 
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Many nuclear materials may be abused for nuclear explosive purposes, but first some 
technical threshold must be overcome before it is converted into a nuclear explosive in-
gredient. The threshold is different for different materials. The IAEA categorizes the ma-
terials according to this threshold.56 The lower the threshold, the stricter are the safe-
guards regulations. The tables shows several nuclear and other materials that play a role in 
regulations and negotiations on arms control, their most important origins, their IAEA 
categorizations, and their role for nuclear explosives. 
The material flows in a closed fuel cycle based on uranium and their IAEA categories 
are illustrated in the figure: 
 
 
56 International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition. 
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Appendix III: Acronyms 
CD Conference on Disarmament  
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
EIF Entry Into Force 
FMCI Fissile Material Control Initiative 
FM(C)T Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty 
GSE Group of Scientific Experts 
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IPFM International Panel on Fissile Material 
LEU Low Enriched Uranium 
MUF Material Unaccounted For 
NPT Nonproliferation Treaty 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations 
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State 
NWS Nuclear Weapon State 
NTM National Technical Means 
P5 Permanent Five 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
 
A treaty on fissile material: just cutoff or more? 39 
 
 
Bibliography 
Acheson, Ray 2009: The Conference on Disarmament in 2009: Could do Better, in: Dis-
armament Diplomacy 91, Summer. 
Albright, David/Berkhout, Frans/Walker, William 1997: Plutonium and Highly Enriched 
Uranium, 1996 – World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies. 
Bidway, P./Vanaik, A. 1997: After the CTB… – India’s Intentions, The Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, March/April, p. 49. 
Bragin, Victor/Carlson, John/Hill, John 1998: Viewpoint: Verifying a Fissile Material Pro-
duction Cut-Off Treaty, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, pp. 97-107. 
Bukharin, Oleg 2001: Downsizing Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure, 
The Nonproliferation Review, Spring, pp. 116-130. 
Bukharin, Oleg 2003: Appendix 8A. Russian and US Technology Development in Support 
of Nuclear Warhead and Material Transparency Initiatives, in: Transparency in Nuc-
lear Warheads and Materials, Ed. Nicholas Zarimpas, p. 165. 
Bunn, George 1998: Viewpoint: Making Progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty after 
the South Asian Tests, The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer, pp. 87-83. 
Bunn, Matthew 2000: The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads 
and Fissile Material, Report Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Har-
vard University. 
Caughley, Tim 2011: The Conference on Disarmament – Breaking the Ice, UNIDIR Re-
sources, July 2011. 
Cortright, D./Mattoo, A 1996: Indian Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy, in: 
Cortright, D./Mattoo, A. (Eds.), India and the Bomb, University of Notre Dame Press. 
Fetter, Steve 1993: Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Pro-
duction, Science and Global Security, Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4, pp. 237–259. 
Fetter, Steve/von Hippel, Frank 1995: A Step-By Step Approach to a Global Fissile Material 
Cutoff, Arms Control Today, October 1995, pp. 3-8. 
Fischer, David/Müller, Harald 1995: United Divided: The European at the NPT Extension 
Conference, PRIF Report No. 40, Frankfurt/M. 
Glaser, A./Bürger, S. 2009: Verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: The Case of 
Enrichment Facilities and the Role of Ultra-Trace Level Isotope Ratio Analysis, Jour-
nal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 280, No.1, pp. 85–90. 
Goodman, Mark 2001: Scope of IAEA Verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: The 
Focused Approach, Symposium on International Safeguards – Verification and Inter-
national Security, IAEA-SM-367/9/05, Vienna. 
Hall, G. 2005: Uranium Age Determination by Measuring the 230Th/234U Ratio, Journal 
of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 264, No 2. 
Hui Zhang 2011: ‘China’s HEU and Plutonium Production and Stocks’, Science & Global 
Security, Vol. 19, pp. 68-89. 
International Panel on Fissile Material, Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Veri-
fication of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, www.fissilematerials.org (13.12.2011). 
40 Annette Schaper 
 
 
International Panel on Fissile Material, Reducing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: 
Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament, 2010, 
www.fissilematerials.org (13.12.2011). 
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition. 
International Atomic Energy Agency 1994: A Cut-off Treaty and Associated Costs – An 
IAEA Secretariat Working Paper on Different Alternatives for the Verification of a 
Fissile Material Production Cut-Off Treaty and Preliminary Cost Estimates Required 
for the Verification of these Alternatives, presented at the Workshop on a Cut-Off 
Treaty, Toronto, Canada, 17-18 January. 
Johnson, Rebecca 1996: Geneva Update – A Summary of Negotiations, Disarmament Dip-
lomacy, No 6, June. 
Johnson, Rebecca 20009: Unfinished Business: Lessons from the CTBT Negotiations, Dis-
armament Diplomacy, No. 91, Summer 2009.  
Kalinowski, Martin B. 2004: International Control of Tritium for Nuclear Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament, Science and Global Security Monograph Series, Vol. 4, London. 
Keller, Stefan 1997: Some Striking Similarities and Some Telling Dissimilarities Between a 
Cutoff Convention and a CTBT, Presentation at the Workshop on “The Cut-Off-
Convention – Interest, Scope, Verification and Problems”, Bonn, December 12, 1996, 
reprinted as Appendix to Schaper 1997. 
Kemp, R. Scott 2008: Initial Analysis of the Detectability of UO2F2 Aerosols Produced by 
UF6 Released from Uranium Conversion Plants, Science & Global Security, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, pp. 115-125. 
LaMont. S.P./Hall, G. 2003: Uranium Age Determination by Measuring the 230Th/234U 
Ratio, Report WSRC-MS-2003-00920, Savannah River Technology Center. 
Maerli, Morten Bremer 2002: Components of Naval Nuclear Fuel Transparency, NATO-
EAPC Fellowship Report, June 2001, revised January 2002. 
Meerburg Arend/von Hippel, Frank N. 2009: Complete Cutoff: Designing a Comprehen-
sive Fissile Material Treaty, Arms Control Today, March. 
Meyer, Paul 2009: A Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty: Some Observations on Scope and 
Verification, Disarmament Diplomacy 91, Summer. 
Meyer, Paul 2007: Is There Any Fizz Left in the Fissban? Prospects for a Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty, Arms Control Today, Vol. 37, December. 
Müller, Harald 1998: The Nuclear Weapons Register – A Good Idea Whose Time Has 
Come, PRIF-Reports No. 51, Frankfurt. 
National Academy of Sciences, 2005: Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Explosive 
Materials, Washington, DC. 
Perkovich, George 1999: India's Nuclear Bomb. 
Prez, Jean du 2006: The Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons Purpos-
es: is it Still Relevant?, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Working Pa-
per No 9. 
Reaching Critical Will: Collection of Resources, Documents, and Background Informa-
tion, www.reachingcriticalwill.org (13.12.2011). 
A treaty on fissile material: just cutoff or more? 41 
 
 
Rissanen, Jenni 2006: Time for a Fissban – or Farewell?, Disarmament Diplomacy No. 83, 
Winter. 
Schaper, Annette 1997: A Treaty on the Cutoff of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons – 
What to Cover? How to Verify?, PRIF Reports No. 48. 
Schaper, Annette 1997: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from a Global Perspective, 
in: Michael McKinzie (Ed.), The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Issues and Answers, 
Cornell University, Peace Studies Program, Occasional Papers, pp. 11-26. 
Schaper, Annette 1999: Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, Disarmament 
Forum, Vol. 2, pp. 45-55. 
Schaper, Annette 2001: Principles of the Verification for a Future Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty (FMCT), PRIF Reports No. 58, Frankfurt. 
Schaper, Annette 2004: Looking for a Demarcation between Nuclear Transparency and 
Nuclear Secrecy, PRIF Reports No. 68, Frankfurt. 
Schaper, Annette 2010: A Treaty on Fissile Material – Just a Cut-off or More?, UNIDIR 
Resources, January. 
Schaper, Annette 2010: Verifying the Non-Production and Elimination of Fissile Material 
for Weapons, in: Corey Hinderstein, Cultivating Confidence – Verification, Monitor-
ing, and Enforcement for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 67-122. 
Shea, Thomas E. 1999: Verification Of Weapon-Origin Fissile Material In The Russian 
Federation & United States, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 4, p. 36. 
Shea, Thomas E. 1993: On the Application of IAEA Safeguards to Plutonium and Highly 
Enriched Uranium from Military Inventories, Science & Global Security, Vol. 3, pp. 
223-236. 
Shea, Thomas E. 2003a: Potential Roles for the IAEA in a Warhead Dismantlement and 
Fissile Material Transparency Regime, in: Nicholas Zarimpas (Ed.), p. 229. 
Shea, Thomas E. 2003b: The FMCT: Potential Treaty Elements and Perspectives on the 
Treaty, Proceedings of the INMM 44 the Annual Meeting. 
Shea, Thomas E. 2010: The Role of the IAEA in a World Reducing Stocks of Nuclear 
Weapons, in: Corey Hinderstein, Cultivating Confidence – Verification, Monitoring, 
and Enforcement for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 229-252. 
Wallenius, M. /Morgenstern, A./Nicholl, A./Fiedler, R./Apostolidis, C./Mayer, K. 2001: Age 
Determination of Highly Enriched Uranium, Paper for the IAEA Symposium on In-
ternational Safeguards – Verification and Nuclear Material Security, IAEA-SM-
367/5/07. 
Wallenius, M./Mayer, K. 2000: Age Determination of Plutonium Material in Nuclear Fo-
rensics by Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry, Fresenius' Journal of Analytical 
Chemistry, Vol. 366, No 3, pp. 234-238. 
Yan Chen, Yan/Chang, Zhi-yuan/Zhao, Yong-gang/Zhang, Ji-long/Li, Jing-huai/Shu, Fu-
jun 2009: Studies on the Age Determination of Trace Plutonium, Journal of Radioana-
lytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 281, No 3, pp. 675-678, 2009. 
 
